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ABSTRACT
Norway and Finland are expected to face relatively strong pressure in their public finances 
due to an ageing population and the resulting growing age-related public expenditure. The 
population of Finland is ageing faster during the next two decades than the rest of the EU 
member states. Although ageing in Norway is expected to be less pronounced than in Finland 
and most other OECD countries, Norway has been projected to experience one of the sharp-
est increases in public expenditures as a share of GDP. In Finland the largest pension reform 
since the initial years of the scheme has taken effect from the beginning of 2005. Likewise 
in Norway, the current national pension insurance scheme will in 2010 entail the most com-
prehensive reform since it was introduced. This paper gives an overview of the structure and 
functioning of Finnish and Norwegian pension provision. The focus is on major features of 
the 2005 reform in Finland and the forthcoming 2010 reform in Norway. 
Norway and Finland share many similarities in their pension reforms and thus in prepara-
tion for ageing society. The recent reform in Finland and the forthcoming reform in Norway 
should significantly reduce the pressures to increase pension contributions. One of the main 
factors in this respect is the establishment of the life expectancy based pension adjustment. The 
idea is to adjust the level of the old age pension to reflect the changes in the longevity. Gains 
in life-expectancy will affect the benefit levels not pension expenditures. In both countries the 
average effective retirement age is clearly below the official retirement age. Strengthening the 
incentives for work has been one of the main principles when countries have renewed their 
pension schemes. The reforms will bring a closer connection between life time earnings and 
the pension. Likewise by increasing flexibility and rewarding for later retirement people are 
encouraged to work longer.
ABSTRAkTi
Norjan ja Suomen julkisen talouden ennustetaan kohtaavan suhteellisen suuria paineita väestön 
ikääntymisen ja ikääntymiseen liittyvien julkisten menojen kasvun vuoksi. Suomessa väestö 
ikääntyy nopeammin kuin muissa EU-maissa seuraavan parin vuosikymmenen aikana. Vaikka 
väestön ikääntymisen ennustetaan Norjassa olevan hitaampaa kuin Suomessa ja useimmissa 
muissa OECD-maissa, Norjan lakisääteisten eläkemenojen BKT-osuuden kasvu on arvioiden 
mukaan yksi nopeimmista. Suomessa tuli vuoden 2005 alusta voimaan eläkejärjestelmän suurin 
uudistus järjestelmän syntyvaiheiden jälkeen. Vastaavasti Norjan nykyinen kansanvakuutus-
järjestelmä kohtaa huomattavimman uudistuksen perustamisensa jälkeen. Tämä paperi antaa 
yleiskuvan Suomen ja Norjan eläkejärjestelmien rakenteesta ja niiden toiminnasta. Päähuomio 
on vuoden 2005 Suomen uudistuksessa ja Norjan tulevassa vuoden 2010 uudistuksessa.
Norjan ja Suomen eläkeuudistuksissa samoin kuin maiden valmistautumisessa ikääntyvään 
yhteiskuntaan on löydettävissä monia yhteisiä piirteitä. Suomen viimeaikaisen uudistuksen ja 
Norjan tulevan eläkeuudistuksen pitäisi vähentää huomattavasti eläkemaksun nousupaineita. 
Yksi päätekijöistä tämän suhteen on elinajanodotteen huomioiminen eläkkeen määräytymisessä. 
Ajatus on sovittaa vanhuuseläkkeiden taso vastaamaan elinajanodotteen muutosta. Elinajano-
dotteen kasvu vaikuttaa etuustasoon, ei eläkemenoon. Molemmissa maissa keskimääräinen 
todellinen eläkkeelle siirtymisikä on selvästi alle varsinaisen eläkeiän. Työnteon kannustavu-
uden lisääminen on ollut yksi pääperiaatteista, kun maat ovat uudistaneet eläkejärjestelmiään. 
Uudistukset lisäävät elinaikaisten ansiotulojen ja eläkkeen välistä yhteyttä. Myös lisäämällä 
joustavuutta ja palkitsemalla myöhäisemmästä eläkkeelle siirtymisestä kannustetaan ihmisiä 
työskentelemään pidempään.     
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1 introduction1
Finland and Norway are both on their way to renew their pension systems. Actually, in Finland 
the largest pension reform since the initial years of the scheme (1962) has already taken ef-
fect from the beginning of 2005. Likewise in Norway, the national pension insurance scheme 
will entail the most comprehensive reform since it was introduced in 1967. The new pension 
system should take effect from 2010. 
Norway and Finland will face a significant ageing of population over coming decades, thus 
the need for pension reform is quite similar to the situation in other OECD countries. However, 
in Finland ageing occurs earlier and is more rapid than in most other OECD countries. Many 
similarities between these two countries can be found in preparing for ageing society. Both 
countries are moving towards a more actuarial system neutralizing the effects from further 
growth in life expectancy. In addition, in both countries the reforms aim to stimulate labor 
supply. Even though both countries have large pension funds the pension scheme will be based 
on an intergenerational solidarity contract and the pension systems are to be financed mainly 
on PAYG-basis.   
The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the structure and functioning of Finn-
ish and Norwegian pension provision. The focus is on major features of the 2005 reform 
in Finland and the forthcoming 2010 reform in Norway. This paper will describe the main 
reasons behind the reforms as well as the main goals and changes caused by these reforms in 
both countries. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, a short economic-demographic over-
view is given from both countries serving as background information for the reader. After 
this the forthcoming pension reform in Norway will be presented in section 3.  This section 
will include a short look to the history and a brief description of the current pension system. 
The main focus is, however, on the 2010 reform. The chapter will concentrate on changes to 
the old-age pension scheme due to fact that for the other pension arrangements the reform 
is still under discussion. Thus, an overall picture of all the elements of the reform can not 
be provided. However, the old age pension of the National Insurance Scheme is the core of 
the overall pension system, thus providing a basis for all the other pension arrangements. In 
chapter 4 we shall turn our look to the Finnish pension system and its reform. As the pension 
reform has already taken effect, a more thorough picture can be given. Finally concluding 
remarks will be made as well as summarizing the main similarities and differences between 
Norway and Finland. 
1  This paper was originally written for the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) 
and it was submitted to the KIHASA at the end of November 2007. Thus, all the details concerning 
the Norwegian pension reform were not known by then. However, some updates have been added 
into this working paper based on the Norwegian Government’s latest proposal (forthcoming bill) 
which was circulated for hearing on January 2008.  
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2 economic-demographic overview of norway and 
 Finland
2.1 Population
Finland and Norway, like most OECD countries, will experience significant population aging 
in the next decades. Population aging is particularly fast in Finland. However, current trends 
imply that in the longer run the rest of the EU will become older than Finland. According to 
the Eurostat 2005 population forecast old-age dependency ratio (65 + per 15–64 years old) 
in Finland will rise from 2002 level of 22 per cent to 41 by 2025 and 44 by 2050. The cor-
responding EU25 figures are 25, 36 and 53 per cent.
Population aging in Norway is milder and comes later than in Finland or in EU25 countries. 
In fact old age dependency ratio in Norway has been falling from early 1990s and it will still 
fall (Figure 2.1).  To some extend differences in projected old-age dependency ratios are caused 
by different projection assumptions (Table 2.1). However, differences in the existing popula-
tion structures are also driving these results. Largest cohorts in Finland are aged between 50 
and 60 years whereas in Norway largest cohorts are aged between 30 and 40. Even though the 
total population in Finland exceeds that of Norway by 14 per cent, number of children aged 
between 0 and 10 years is slightly smaller in Finland than in Norway (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.1. Old-age dependency ratios in Norway and Finland, 1950–2060.
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Sources: Statistics Norway population statistics and the population projection 2005. Statistic Finland population 
statistics and the population projection 2007. The Statistics Finland projection ends to year 2040, it is extended in 
the Finnish Centre for Pensions beyond that year.
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Figure 2.2. Population pyramids, Norway and Finland 2005. 
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Table 2.1. Overview of the assumptions for the population projections. 
 
Norway Finland
Total Fertility rate 1.8 1.84
Net immigration per year 16 000 10 000
Life-expectancy at birth 2002 2050 2002 2050
Men 76.5 84,7 74.9 85.8
Women 81.6 88.9 81.5 89.7
Relatively high fertility is characteristic to both Norway and Finland. Birth rates close to re-
placement rate and significant net immigration together mean that new birth-cohorts will not 
decline in their size. Growth in life expectancy is projected to be strong in both countries. At 
first sight life-expectancy gains may seem exaggerated, at least in Finland. However, these as-
sumptions fit nicely to the observed trend (Figure 2.3). One consequence of these assumptions 
is that the populations of these two countries will grow until the end of the projection period
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Figure 2.3. Life-expectancy at birth, Norway and Finland 1950-2060.2
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2.2 Macroeconomic trends
Finland
In Finland the total production growth has been strong since deep recession in early 1990s. 
Between 1995 and 2006 an average growth rate has been close to 4 per cent. Among old EU-
countries only Ireland has enjoyed stronger growth rates.  Economic growth is expected to 
cool somewhat in 2008 to about 2½ to 3 per cent. Inflation has also been among the lowest in 
the EU, with the general government surplus nearing 4 per cent of GDP, a surplus expected to 
persist in 2007. The budget has benefited from higher-than-expected growth combined with 
a determined implementation of the government’s multi-year spending limits on outlays. The 
debt ratio has fallen below 50 per cent of GDP (and expected to fall below 40), and the pen-
sion systems’ assets now approach 70 per cent of GDP.
The labour market has improved markedly since the mid 1990s, with rising participation 
rates and comparatively strong employment growth. Following the recession of the early 1990s, 
the unemployment rate reached 16.8 per cent in 1994 and the employment rate fell to a low of 
60 per cent. From 1995 onward, the recovery allowed for a reduction in the unemployment rate 
to current 7 per cent, and a rise of the employment rate close to 70 per cent. The employment 
rates for, in particular, people aged from 59 to 64 years have increased. This latest employment 
figure leaves Finland above the OECD average at 65.5 per cent, but well below other Northern 
European countries.  Although Finland has experienced improvement in unemployment and 
employment rates over the past 15 years, it is now broadly in line with the OECD average. 
2 Sources: Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research (Germany), available at www.mortality.org and the national 
population projections 2005 (Norway) and 2007 (Finland). 
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Especially men lag clearly behind the OECD average, whereas women’s participation in the 
labour market has traditionally been high. (Table 2.2) The total development of the social 
protection expenditure has been moderate despite the increased demand for pension security 
and social welfare and health-care services and the high unemployment rate. In 2005–2007, 
the ratio of social spending to the GDP continued to be 26–27 per cent, which is still below 
the EU average (for a decomposition of social expenditure in 2005 see Annex 1).
Norway
Growth in the Norwegian economy has been strong for the past three years. Since the summer 
of 2003, the Norwegian economy has seen a recovery. The gross domestic product (GDP) 
increased by 2.9 per cent in 2006, while the GDP for “mainland Norway” (excluding income 
from oil and foreign shipping trade) increased by 4.6 per cent., with mainland GDP expanding 
by around 4½ per cent annually. The high oil prices, which are a result of vigorous growth in 
the world economy for several years, have contributed to steep growth in Norway’s disposable 
real income. The strong growth is expected to continue in 2007. Also wage and price inflation 
have been remarkably subdued. This has been underpinned by the two strong macroeconomic 
policy pillars of inflation targeting (target of 2½ per cent) and the fiscal guidelines, both adopted 
in 2001. Fiscal policy has been prudent, and in 2007, for the first time since 2001, the central 
government non-oil structural deficit is set to meet the target of 4 per cent of the assets of the 
Government Pension Fund-Global (GPF), in line with the fiscal guidelines.
The large oil and gas revenues, as well as the policy of saving these revenues and investing 
them abroad through the GPF, have allowed Norway to run large budget surpluses and amass 
large net government assets. For example, according to IMF (2007) in 2006, the budget surplus 
of the general government was estimated at 25.9 per cent of its mainland GDP. At the end 
of 2006, net assets of the general government equaled 150.2 per cent of mainland GDP. The 
Government Pension Fund was about 121 per cent of mainland GDP (80 per cent of GDP) in 
2006. Although the government’s net cash flows from petroleum operations are expected to 
gradually decline, Norway is expected to run large fiscal surpluses for many years to come.
Employment has increased substantially and the unemployment rate is now the lowest in 
almost 20 years. Norway represents high participation rates for both men and women. The 
unemployment rate is expected further to decline from an average of 3.4 per cent in 2006 to 
2.5 per cent in 2007. Employment is expected to grow by 2.1 per cent in 2007. 
The labor market has tightened significantly over the last couple of years. However, the 
ability to absorb substantial numbers of immigrant workers testifies to its flexibility. The tight-
ening of the labor market contributes to higher wage growth.  Based on the wage negotiations 
concluded so far, wage growth is estimated at 4¾ per cent in 2007. Higher wage growth is 
expected to lead once again to higher underlying consumer price inflation in 2007.
Finnish and Norwegian Pension Reform – Implications for Preparing Aged Society 
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Table 2.2. Key figures of the Finnish and Norwegian economies, 2005.
norway Finland oeCD 
GDP billion, PPPs, US$,current prices 218.2 162.4
GDP per capita at PPPs, US$, current prices 47 207 30 959 30 065
Employment rate, total, % (15–64 years) 
- Men 
- Women 
- 55–64 years old (men and women) 
 
Unemployment rate, % 
 
Total tax revenue, % of GDP 
 
Gross public debt % of GDP  
 
Consumer price index (CPI), change 2004-05,% 
75.2 
78.3 
72.0 
67.6 
 
4.6 
 
44.0 
 
50.6 
 
1.6
68.0 
69.4 
66.5 
52.6 
 
8.4 
 
44.2 
 
48.3 
 
0.7
65.5 
75.0 
56.1 
52.0 
 
6.6 
 
35.9 
 
76.9 
 
2.6
 
Source: OECD Factbook 2007.
2.3 income distribution and relative poverty  
The basic principles of the Finnish and Norwegian social security system are founded on the 
Nordic welfare model which is described as comprehensive or universal. One of the main 
principles is that the statutory social insurance provides insurance cover for all citizens against 
loss of income or high costs arising from major social risks such as illness, disability, unem-
ployment, accidents, old age, spouse’s death or childbirth. 
The Nordic model has also proven to be egalitarian. Essentially all benefits are “gender-
neutral”, in that women are treated as individuals with needs and rights of their own. In addition 
general taxation has the effect of redistributing income. Several previous studies have shown 
that the differences in the income levels are smaller in the Nordic countries than in most of 
the OECD countries (Figure 2.4). Income distribution in the Nordic countries has also stayed 
below the OECD average for decades. Even though income inequality has increased since the 
early 1980s in Norway and especially in Finland, the Gini coefficient is still among the lowest 
in the OECD area (see Annex 2). Income inequality among the elderly population has tended 
to be lower than among the population of working age. The distribution of income among the 
households is very similar in Norway and Finland (see Annex 3). 
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Figure 2.4. Gini coefficients of income concentration in 27 OECD countries, 2000.
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As a result of the Nordic countries’ universal, redistributive social insurance systems, pover-
ty rates are among the lowest in comparison to EU-15 or OECD countries. In the following 
(Figure 2.5) at-risk-of-poverty rate comparison has been made for persons aged 65 years and 
over in EU-15 countries and Norway. As can be seen Finland and Norway look very similar 
standing side by side below the EU-15 average. 
Figure 2.5. The share of persons (65 years and over), in EU-15 countries and Norway, with 
an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of 
the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers), 2005.  
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Similarities and dissimilarities in living conditions across countries come more into focus 
when the situation of different household types is examined. Table 2.3 shows the ratio of the 
population living in households with an income of less than 50 and 60 per cent of the median 
equivalent disposable income in 2004. The use of two different kinds of thresholds provides 
an indication of the number of people with incomes just above or below the chosen threshold. 
In both countries the poverty risk of the elderly clearly increases when the threshold is set 
at 60 per cent. Once again these two countries look very similar. The poverty risk is highest 
among those living alone. Especially single people over 65 have a higher poverty risk than 
others in both countries. The results support the fact that relative income poverty among the 
elderly tends to be concentrated among the very old and those living alone. These features 
concern especially women as they live longer than men and they have not been able to accrue 
a sufficient earnings-related pension. Otherwise, the relative risk of poverty for the elderly is 
very close to all the other households.  
Table 2.3. Proportion of the population living in households with an income of less 
than 50 and 60 per cent of the median equivalent disposable income, per cent, 2004. 
 
Finland norway
50% 60% 50% 60%
Single childless people under 65/67 years 15.4 26.9 19.1 25.2
Single providers 6.3 20.3 10.0 18.7
Childless couples under 65/67 years 2.8 5.3 2.3 4.0
Couples with children 3.1 7.9 2.8 5.7
Single people over 65/67 years 11.5 36.0 10.5 37.1
Couples, where one or both partners are over 65/67 
years 2.5 8.6 0.7 5.0
All households 5.1 11.7 6.0 11.0
 
Source: Nososco 2007.
In both countries the most important long-term fiscal challenge is posed by the effects of 
population aging, expected to begin in the next decade. In both countries the reforms, once 
implemented, promise improved work incentives likewise long-term pension savings. In the 
following these will be discussed more thoroughly. 
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3 Pension schemes in norway
3.1 important years in the national Pension insurance Scheme 
The Norwegian pension system has remained quite intact since the introduction of the na-
tional pension insurance scheme. The national pension insurance scheme secures an income 
in the event of old age, incapacity for work and death of the family breadwinner. The scheme 
is administered by NAV, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Organisation, which was estab-
lished on July 1, 2006. NAV is a merger of three former organizations: the National Insurance 
organisation (state), the National Employment Service (state) and The Social Welfare System 
(municipal). 
The old age pension insurance scheme was introduced in 1936 with the retirement age of 
70 years. The pension was means tested and paid to poor. The means testing was removed in 
1957 and the old age pension was paid as an equal amount to all. The current National Pension 
Insurance Scheme3 was established in 1967 introducing a basic pension to all pensioners, and 
a new element – the employment based supplementary pension, which is paid in addition to 
the basic pension. The supplementary pension is earnings-related whereas the residence-based 
basic pension provides a flat-rate minimum income. In 1969 an income test was once again 
incorporated in the national pension scheme in the form of special supplement for pensioners 
who have no, or only small earnings-related supplementary pension. 
Disability pensions date back to 1936 as temporary measures were introduced to provide 
assistance to the blind and disabled, but these were replaced in 1960 by a general disability 
insurance scheme which in turn became part of the National Insurance Scheme in 1967. Like-
wise, survivors’ benefits were made part of the National Insurance Scheme of 1967, replacing 
earlier allowances for surviving children from 1957 and widows’ allowances from 1964.
Later on main changes have been made to the retirement age and to determining factors of 
the earnings-related pension especially by changing the earnings limits upon which the pen-
sion is calculated.  Under the National Pension Insurance Scheme pensions are determined in 
relation to the basic amount (B.a). For example, a full basic pension equals 100 per cent of the 
B.a. and a full special supplement is 79.33 per cent of the B.a. The basic amount is adjusted 
by Parliament each year, in accordance with changes in the general income level. The adjust-
ment takes place 1 May each year. The B.a. is 8,352 euros (NOK 66,812) per 1 May 20074.  In 
calculation of earnings-related supplementary pension (so called pension points) the average 
B.a. is used and it’s value per 1 May 2007 is 8 190 euros (NOK 65 505). 
3 The National Insurance Act came into force on 1 January 1967. Currently benefits from the National 
Insurance Scheme are granted according to an act of 28 February 1997. 
4  Exchange rate used: 1 Norwegian krone (NOK) = 0,125 euros (average rate August 2007).
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The ceiling for pensionable earnings and for earnings from which contributions are collected 
was at first set at 8 times the B.a. In 1970 the ceiling was raised to 12 B.a. However, only 
income up to 8 B.a. was credited at full rate and income between 8 B.a. and 12 B.a. at 1/3. 
Pension contributions were collected at full rate up to the ceiling. In 1986 this ceiling for na-
tional insurance contributions was erased, so that nowadays contributions are also paid from 
incomes that do not give any pension right. In 1992 the benefit level was reduced so that the 
bending point was lowered from 8 B.a. to 6 B.a. and income between 6 B.a. and 12 B.a. was 
credited at 1/3. Also the supplementary pension per centage (wage-benefit ratio) was lowered 
from 45 per cent to its current 42 per cent level. On the other hand, pension accruals granted in 
the case of unpaid care was introduced. In 1998 the special supplement was raised from 63.2 
per cent up to current 79.33 per cent of the B.a. Originally (in 1969) it was set at 7.5% B.a.    
The retirement age was reduced from 70 to current 67 in 1973. The retirement age was made 
flexible in that sense that it is possible for the insured person to continue at work and accrue 
a pension until the age of 70. However, the pension is reduced (40 per cent of the exceeding 
income) if the earnings exceed a determined limit (2 B.a. in 2007) in the period between the age 
of 67 and the age of 70. It is not possible to draw old-age pension from the National Pension 
Insurance Scheme before the general retirement age, except for certain categories of insured 
persons5. However, other pension schemes make retirement possible several years earlier. 
3.2 Description of the current pension scheme 
Today, every insured person is guaranteed a minimum old-age pension, which consists of 
the aforementioned basic pension and a special supplement. The minimum old-age pension 
is independent of previous income and contributions paid. A full pension is paid if the insur-
ance period (residence) is at least 40 years. If the insurance period is shorter the pension 
will be proportionally reduced. For a single pensioner the full minimum old-age pension is 
1,250 euros (NOK 9,985) a month per 1 May 2007. The special supplement is reduced by 
100 per cent of the earnings-related supplementary pension. In addition a pensioner may receive 
possible supplements (income-tested) for children and spouse. 
The amount of the supplementary pension depends on the number of pension-earning years 
and the yearly pension points. A full supplementary pension requires as a general rule 40 years of 
accrual. Otherwise the pension is reduced proportionally. A full annual supplementary pension 
is 42 per cent of the amount which appears when the current B.a. is multiplied by the average 
pension point for the person’s twenty best income years (final pension point). The maximum 
of pension points, which could be credited for any one year before 1992, was 8.33. For earn-
ings from year 1992 on, the maximal pension point is 7. Example of pension calculation can 
5 There are pension schemes that are adapted to the National Insurance Scheme and they function as 
special early retirement schemes for people under the age of 67. Pension insurance for seamen was 
introduced in 1949. The retirement age for seamen is 60. Pension insurance schemes for forestry 
workers and fishermen were introduced in 1952 and 1958 respectively. The retirement age is 63 
for forestry workers and 62 for fishermen. The scheme for forestry workers ceased to exist as per 
31 December 2005.
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be found in Annex 4.  Figure 3.1 shows the pension recipient’s statutory pension consisting 
of the minimum pension and the earnings-related pension. 
Figure 3.1. Basic structure of the Norwegian statutory pension.
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The number of old age pensioners at the end of 2006 was 634,216 (see also Annex 6). 
The number of pensioners who receive the special supplement is declining, 184,123 pensioners 
(29%) received the supplement at the end of 2006. About 88% of these were women (161 434). 
Supplementary pension was received by 580,784 pensioners (91.6%). (NAV.) 
The average old-age pension was about 1 516 euros per month (NOK 12,131) at the end 
of 2006. Average old-age pension for men was 1,800 euros (NOK 14,419) and for women 
1,310 euros (NOK 10,478) per month. (NAV.) The average wage was 3 945 euros per month 
(NOK 31,565) in 2006; for men 4,130 euros (NOK 33,060) and 3,590 euros (NOK 28,707) 
for women (Statistics Norway). Large differences in the benefits payable to men and women 
can be seen to be due to a larger accumulation of earnings-related pension for men.
Financing
The national pension scheme is a PAYG system and is financed by contributions from em-
ployees, self-employed persons and employers and financial support from the State. Norway 
also has a large pension fund, which is fully integrated into the state budget (see below for 
further information).
 The contribution rates and the level of state grants are decided upon by Parliament. In addi-
tion to pensions the following contributions finance the whole National Insurance Scheme. The 
pension reform should establish a separate pension premium to make old-age pension saving 
more visible. This is now under consideration by the Government. The pension commission 
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proposal for the pension premium was about 17 ½ per cent corresponding to an accrual rate 
of pension credits 1.25 per cent for each year of employment at today’s life expectancy and 
retirement at the age of 67.
At the moment the social insurance contribution rate for employees is 7.8% of pensionable 
income (gross wage income). The rate of a self-employed person’s contribution is 10.7% of 
pensionable income6 (income from self-employment). The contribution rate for other kinds 
of personal income (pensions etc.) is 3.0%. 
The employer’s contribution is assessed as a per centage of paid-out wages. The contribu-
tions are differentiated according to the regional zone in which the employees reside. There are 
seven regional zones reflecting inter alia the level of economic development. The employer’s 
contributions are 14.1% (zones I and I a), 10.6% (I a and II), 6.4% (III), 5.1% (IV), 7.9% (IV 
a) and 0% (V) according to the zone. 
Government Pension Fund
The origin of the Government Pension Fund can be traced back to 1990 when the Norwegian 
Government Petroleum Fund was formally established. However, the fund mechanism entails 
that money will only be allocated to the fund when there is a budget surplus. In the first half of 
the 1990s there were budget deficits due to the strong recession. Only in 1995 was the budget 
back in surplus, and the first transfer from the state budget to the Petroleum Fund was made 
in 1996 for fiscal year 1995. After that the Fund has grown strongly. 
In order to strengthen the public’s sense of ownership of the Fund and make it easier to 
accumulate financial assets for the state, the Norwegian Parliament adopted the Act relating to 
the Government Pension Fund in 2005 and establishment in 2006. The name change underlines 
the aim of the Fund to support savings for financing future pension payments. The pension 
system under the National Insurance Scheme will, however, remain financed over government 
budgets on an ongoing basis (”pay-as-you-go”).
The Government Pension Fund consists of two parts: ”The Government Pension Fund – 
Global”, which is a continuation of the Petroleum Fund, and ”The Government Pension Fund 
– Norway”, which was previously known as the National Insurance Scheme Fund (Folket-
rygdfondet). The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the management of the Government 
Pension Fund. The operational management of the Pension Fund – Global is carried out by the 
Central Bank (Norges Bank), which invests the fund’s capital in bonds and equities outside 
Norway in accordance with guidelines issued by the Ministry. Equities account for 60% of 
the Fund’s strategic benchmark portfolio, consisting of equities listed on exchanges in Europe 
(50%), America/Africa (35%) and Asia/Oceania (5%). Fixed income instruments account for 
40% of the portfolio, consisting of fixed instruments issued in currencies from Europe (60%), 
America/Africa (35%) and Asia/Oceania (5%).  At the moment actual benchmark portfolio 
somewhat differs as the equity portion is being gradually increased from 40 to 60 per cent fol-
6 For certain categories of self-employed persons (fishing, forestry, agriculture) the contribution rate 
is 7.8%.
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lowing the guidelines of Report No. 24 (2006–2007) presented to the Parliament on 13 April, 
2007 (Ministry of Finance 2007). 
The operational management of the Pension Fund – Norway is carried out by Folketrygd-
fondet and it is primarily invested domestically. Equities account for 60% of Fund’s portfo-
lio, consisting of equities invested in Norway (85%) and in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
(15%). Fixed income instruments account for 40% of the portfolio with the same portfolio as 
for equities.   
The Government Pension Fund-Global consists of petroleum revenues whereas the basic 
capital of Government Pension Fund-Norway originates primarily from surpluses in the national 
insurance accounts from the introduction of the National Insurance Scheme. The market value 
of the Government Pension Fund-Global at 31 December 2006 was 223 euros (NOK 1,783.7) 
billion (NOK 1,966.6 billion at 31 August 2007), about 114% of mainland GDP7 (i.e. exclud-
ing petroleum activities). (Norges Bank 2007.) The market value of the Government Pension 
Fund-Norway was 13.6 euros (NOK 109.1) billion i.e. about 7% of mainland GDP.
The fund is created to meet the rapid rise in public pension expenditures in the coming 
years. Still, the fund is not earmarked for pension expenditures. The outflow from the fund 
is the sum needed to cover the non-oil budget deficits. This also means that net allocations to 
the fund reflect the total budget surplus. Fiscal policy, which regulates the outflow from the 
fund, is anchored in the guideline that over time the structural, non-oil budget deficit shall 
correspond to the real return on the fund, estimated at 4%. Thus, in a way real return can be 
seen to provide a partial pre-funding of pension liabilities. Operation of the Pension Fund is 
further discussed in chapter 3.5.1.
3.3 AFP- collectively bargained early retirement scheme
In addition to the national pension scheme a large share, about 60%, of the working population 
is covered by the AFP-arrangement, an early retirement scheme which was introduced through 
the 1988 collective negotiations, and extended in later bargaining rounds during the 1990s8. 
People covered by the AFP-scheme can retire at the age of 62 years with little or no reduc-
tion in the pension amount (compared to the amount the person would receive if retired at the 
age of 67 years). The rationale behind the establishment was not to allow for a combination 
of work and pension, but to relieve older employees who for health reasons wanted to retire 
earlier than the general retirement age of 67. At the time the retirement age was set at 66 years, 
but has later been reduced on several occasions; to 65 in 1990, 64 in 1992, 63 in 1997, and 
finally 62 in 1998. It was not until 1997 that the introduction of the so-called ‘partial pension’ 
opportunity enabled employees to combine pension with paid employment in the AFP. On 
several occasions the scheme has been criticised for being too generous in the meaning that 
7 Mainland GDP (2006):NOK 1 563 243 million ; GDP (2006, total): NOK 2 151 670 million (Sta-
tistics Norway).
8 The AFP was first introduced in 1988 by means of an agreement between the Norwegian Confed-
eration of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LO) and the Confederation of Norwegian 
Business and Industry (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, NHO).
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too many people leave early and that many of the employees who leave could have stayed 
in employment longer. The number of pensioners has risen and at the moment there are over 
40,000 AFP-pensioners (figure 3.2).  Both the employers’ organisations and the Government 
have argued that the scheme should be revised (or abolished). The trade unions and in particular 
the Norwegian Trade Union Confederation (LO) have strongly defended the scheme.
Figure 3.2. Number of AFP-pensioners in 1995–2006.
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3.4 occupational pension schemes
In the public sector, occupational pensions have existed for many years. Pension arrangements 
for state employees and The Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund were established by law 
in 1917 and cover all central government employees. During the years after the Second World 
War, occupational pensions were gradually introduced both in the municipal and the private 
sector. The Municipal Insurance Company was established in 1949 and administers almost all 
the special pension schemes for local government employees. Practically also all municipal 
employees are covered by occupational pensions. In the public sector extensive coordination 
rules exist governing the relationship between public sector pension schemes and the National 
Insurance Scheme. E.g. civil service pension scheme guarantees employees 66 per cent of 
their wage level at the time of retirement (regardless of changes in the level of the national 
pension insurance scheme) after 30 years of service. 
Coverage of occupational pensions was unequal before the Act relating to mandatory occu-
pational pensions entered into force on 2006. Before this, approximately 40% of the employees 
were covered by occupational pension schemes in the private sector. 
In the private sector the great majority of the occupational schemes are company specific 
and mainly defined benefit schemes. Up to 2000, only defined benefit schemes were given the 
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special taxation treatment, which is the reason why so few defined contribution schemes were 
developed in Norway. From 2001, the Act on Defined Contribution Occupational Pensions 
has regulated defined contribution plans9. The new regulations provided tax allowances also 
for companies with DC-plans. 
Based on the white paper regarding the future pension system in Norway (St. meld. nr 
12 (2004–2005), the Storting decided 26 May 2005 that legislation regarding mandatory 
occupational pension should enter into force from 1 January 2006.The 2006 Act relating to 
mandatory occupational pensions means that most employers must either have a DC or a DB 
pension scheme for their employees. Employers who already have an occupational pension 
scheme must ensure that the scheme satisfies the Act’s minimum requirements. The Act does 
not apply to employers who have a pension scheme in accordance with legislation or collective 
agreements that apply to state or local authority employees.
Employers will pay contributions into the scheme every year and the contribution must be 
at least 2 per cent of the employees’ earnings between 1 B.a. and 12 B.a. in a DC-scheme. A 
corresponding requirement applies to DB schemes. In addition to the contribution, the pension 
scheme shall also contain an insurance element that ensures that employees continue to accrue 
pension entitlements in the event of disability. It is permitted to exclude employees under the 
age of 20 and those in part-time employment of less than 20 per cent of a full-time position 
from the pension scheme. Employees may be required to also contribute to their own pensions, 
but such contributions will not reduce the minimum requirement for employers’ contributions. 
The main rule is that pensions shall be paid for at least 10 years from the age of 67 years.
3.5 The 2010 pension reform 
3.5.1 Challenges facing the pension system
The most important long-term fiscal challenge is posed by the effects of population ageing. 
The ageing of the population is caused by the fact that pensioners live longer than previous 
generations.  In addition the share of the working age population is shrinking due to declining 
birth rates. 
The latest population projections from Statistics Norway, which were used in the Pension 
Commission’s work, estimate that the remaining life expectancy for a 67-year old will increase 
from about 17 years today to 22 years in 2050. It was 14 years in 1973 when the retirement 
age was lowered to 67. The share of the population 65 years and older is projected to almost 
double towards 2050 as a share of the working population, from slightly more than 22 per 
cent today, to approximately 40 per cent in 2050.  
It is estimated that expenditure on old-age, disability and dependents’ pensions within the 
National Insurance Scheme increases from 9 per cent of mainland Norway GDP at present 
to almost 20 per cent in 2050 under a continuation of the current pension system.  This is 
9 The new Act relating to defined-benefit pension plans also took effect on 1 January 2001. The 
regulation of occupational pension schemes was previously covered by the Act relating to taxation 
on property and income..
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mainly caused by expenditure on old-age pension which is estimated to increase from 6 to 
about 15 per cent of mainland Norway GDP. (St.meld. nr. 5 (2006–2007.) This is a significant 
increase and well above the average when compared to other OECD-countries (see Bellone 
and Bibbee 2006). 
In addition to growing financial burden there are a number of other, so called system-related 
challenges in Norwegian pension system that have become more evident over the almost 40 
years that have passed since the introduction of the current pension system. The main chal-
lenges relate to:
Poor correlation between the overall career income and the pension.• 
Uneven possibility for flexible retirement as it is not possible to draw old-age pension • 
under the statutory pension system before the age of 67. Early retirement for non-health 
related causes is today only available for those who have access to pension schemes 
outside the National Insurance Scheme, such as the AFP or occupational pension sche-
mes with special retirement ages. 
Lack of incentives to remain at work after the age of 62 as the AFP-scheme is designed • 
to give the same pension at the age of 62 as if one had remained working until reaching 
the age of 67. 
The civil service pension guarantee a total pension benefit (66%). This implies that • 
government employees are sheltered against changes to the statutory pension system. 
In addition, as long as private and government pension schemes differ, this may to some 
extent prevent mobility between the private and the public sector. 
Despite Norway’s relatively high statutory retirement age a key problem over the past decade 
has been the fall in the effective retirement age (see Annex 5). Consequently, even though 
Norway boasts the highest OECD employment ratios for older workers (aged 55 to 64), em-
ployment rates fall sharply with age, particularly from age 62. This kind of development can 
largely be seen to be encouraged by the AFP-scheme. The effect of the AFP-scheme can be 
seen from the following figure describing the pathways to early retirement in Norway. 
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Figure 3.3. Share of population aged 50 to 66 on different kind of “early retirement” benefits, 
2005.   
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Limited petroleum wealth
The petroleum revenues place Norway in a more favourable financial position than most other 
countries when it comes to dealing with the growth in pension expenditure. Projections pre-
sented in the Norwegian Government’s white paper indicate that the Pension Fund will grow 
to 195 per cent of mainland GDP at the end of 2010. Given the present guidelines for fiscal 
policy, the Fund is expected to reach a level of around 250 per cent of mainland GDP by the 
year 2020, before starting to gradually decline. 
However, as can be seen (Figure 3.4) the accrued pension liabilities substantially exceed 
the assets of the Government Pension Fund.  According to the Ministry of Finance the value 
of the old age pensions accrued was about 480 euros (NOK 3,874) billion at the beginning of 
2006 and the amount of pension assets approximately 236 euros (NOK 1,890) billion. Thus, 
about 49 per cent of the accrued old age pensions were funded in advance. In 2007 the cor-
responding ratio has risen almost to 55 per cent.     
Taking into account also disability and survivors’ pensions, the pension liabilities were 
estimated at slightly over 300 per cent of mainland GDP in 2006, increasing up to 420 per 
cent of GDP in 2050. 
In addition, unlike most pension funds, the capital of the Government Pension Fund-Global 
cannot be dedicated to meeting future pension obligations, only its expected real return of 4%, 
given the fiscal rule. The guidelines for economic policy stipulate that fiscal policy shall be 
geared towards a gradual and sustainable use of petroleum revenues. Over time the structural 
non-oil deficit shall correspond to the expected real return on the Government Pension Fund 
- Global, estimated at 4 per cent. Therefore, only real return can be seen to provide a partial 
pre-funding of future pension liabilities. The fund is mainly a transformation of depleting re-
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sources (oil and gas) into financial assets. As this wealth belongs in theory to present and future 
Norwegian generations, the capital stock should be preserved, and only the returns consumed, 
to allow future generations their own choices in allocating these earnings. However, since the 
fiscal guidelines were established in 2001, the use of petroleum revenues has exceeded the 
expected real return on the Pension Fund – Global. This is also one of the reasons why the 
Government proposed a revised Fiscal Budget for 2007 with an estimated structural, non-oil 
deficit somewhat lower than in the approved budget and below the expected 4 per cent real 
return on the Fund.
From 1997 until year end 2006, the average annual return on the Government Pension 
Fund-Global was 6.5 per cent, whilst the average annual real return (after management costs 
and inflation) which is of relevance under the fiscal rule adopted for budget policy purposes 
was 4.6 per cent, as measured in foreign currency (Ministry of Finance 2007) (for closer look 
see Annex 7). 
Figure 3.4. The Government Pension Fund and accrued pension liabilities, per cent of main-
land GDP 2005–2060. 
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 3.5.2 Background of the reform process 
On 30 March 2001, the Stoltenberg Government appointed a Commission, with members from 
the parties holding seats in the Parliament (Storting) and independent experts, to examine the 
main objectives and principles of a reform of the overall pension system (incl. reforms to na-
tional pension insurance scheme, AFP scheme and occupational schemes). The Commission 
published a preliminary report on 4 September 2002. 
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The Commission was to submit its final report to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs within 1 October 2003. In autumn 2003, the deadline for completion 
of the Pension Commission’s work was somewhat extended, and the Commission submitted 
its final report on 13 January 2004 in a green paper (NOU 2004:1 Modernised National Insur-
ance Scheme – Sustainable Pensions for the Future). A broad majority of the members of the 
Pension Commission, comprising all members except those from the Party of Progress and the 
Socialist Left Party, supported, in the final report, a reform of the old age pension under the 
National Insurance Scheme.  The Commission assumed a gradual introduction of a modernised 
National Insurance Scheme from 2010 onwards. The report of the Pension Commission was 
circulated for consultation on 14 January.
On 10 December 2004, the Norwegian government issued a White Paper (Stortingsmeld-
ing nr. 12 (2004–2005) proposing changes to the present pension system on the basis of the 
Commission’s report. On 26 May 2005, the Norwegian Parliament, Storting, made decision 
on the main principles for a pension reform. The Storting asked the government to return with 
evaluations and proposals for amendments in the pension system in a number of fields.
Following the compromise reached by parliament in the spring of 2005 the Norwegian 
government presented its proposal for a new pension system in October 2006. (White Paper: 
Stortingsmelding nr.5 (2006–2007)). Finally on 23 April 2007 parliament reached broad-based 
agreement on reform. Agreement closely follows the government’s 2006 white paper.  Although 
some questions still remain unresolved, the main characteristics are clear10.
In connection with the old-age pension reform also disability and survivors’ pensions must 
be adapted to the new old-age pension. Government appointed a public committee on 5 August 
2005 which was mandated with committing a study on a new disability pension scheme. The 
committee published a report (proposal) for a new disability pension scheme on16 May 2007 
(NOU 2007:4).  The report was circulated for consultation on 13 June with the final date of 
1 October 2007. Evaluations and proposals as regards the survivors’ pension scheme will be 
examined later on by the Government.
In addition to the statutory pension schemes the AFP (early retirement pension) scheme 
is to be renewed and integrated with the new general early retirement scheme. A tripartite 
commission set up by the Norwegian government in June 2007 is expected to propose a new 
early retirement pension scheme by the end of 2007 and the scheme will be incorporated into 
the wage settlements for 2008. 
As a part of the overall pension reform, an obligation was introduced for enterprises to 
establish an occupational pension scheme securing their employees an old age pension in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the Act on mandatory occupational pensions. The deadline 
for establishing such a mandatory occupational pension scheme was set at the end on 2006, 
and it had to have economic effect for the employees from 1 July 2006 (latest). The main 
principles of mandatory occupational pension were already presented in this paper as part of 
the current pension system description. 
10 More detailed Government’s paper (forthcoming bill) was sent on hearing on January 2008. The 
Government bill shall be given to the Parliament later in the spring.  
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3.5.3  Main aspects of the pension reform
The pension reform is to be gradually phased in from 2010.  The main goals of the Govern-
ment in pursuing a reform are:
 (1) Making the pension system economically and socially sustainable. This means a pension 
system which over time does not impose too great a financial burden on the occupationally 
active. A prerequisite for an economically and socially sustainable pension system is that it 
gives good incentives for work.
 (2) Having a good income redistribution profile and gender profile. This is pursued by 
ensuring that all retirees receive a guaranteed minimum state pension and furthermore that all 
those who have had pension earning get something in return, on top of the minimum pension. 
This is also of importance for women as long as women have lower incomes than men. Today, 
many occupationally active women receive a minimum pension in the same way as people 
without previous income from work. In addition, pension earning must reflect the work effort 
throughout life. Thus, it is also important to compensate for loss of income due unpaid care.
 (3) Being simple and comprehensible the reform should contribute simplicity to make the 
individuals able to calculate the size of their pension under different circumstances. People 
should also be able to make well-founded decisions on when to retire and on the need for 
saving for one’s old age.  
Following the overarching aims the forthcoming pension reform is based on the following 
main principles: 
Calculation of benefits based on lifelong earnings• 
A flexible retirement age under the National Insurance Scheme• 
Introduction of a life expectancy adjustment ratio• 
Changing indexation rules• 
Basic security in the form of a guaranteed pension• 
Redefining and extending pension rights for non-working periods.• 
The main principles above bring new model for pension accrual likewise for drawing 
pensions when compared to the present system (see Table 3.1). Each element of the reform 
will be further discussed below. 
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Table 3.1. The main changes to the Norwegian pension system. 
 
Pre-reform After reform
Retirement age 
Insurance period 
Pensionable wage 
Life-expectancy adjustment 
Upper earnings limit (ceiling)   
 
 
Wage-benefit ratio 
 
 
 
Unpaid care (minimum 
amount) 
Unpaid care for children  
Military service  
Indexing income-based pen-
sion payments 
Indexing pension entitlements 
 
 
 
Minimum pension (amount) 
 
 
Occupational pensions
67 
40 years 
Best 20 years 
Not applicable 
Staggered ceiling from 6 B.a 
to upper limit 12 B.a 
 
42% + 1 B.a (DB-model)   
 
 
 
Pension earning equal to 4 
B.a.up to the age of 7years 
Not pensionable earning 
 
Wage growth 
 
Wage growth 
 
 
 
1,7933 x B.a 
 
 
Voluntary
From the age of 62 (flexible) 
Lifelong earnings 
All career earnings 
Life expectancy adjustment ratio 
All income up to 7.1 B.a. (linear)1 
 
 
18.1% of income (up to ceiling) 
into individual account each year 
(NDC-model)2 
 
Pension earning equal to 4.5 
B.a. up to the age of 6 years1 
2.5 B.a. as the basis for pension 
earning 
 
Wage growth – 0.75% 
(constant)3 
 
Wage growth 
 
Guarantee pension at the cur-
rent level, reduced by 80% of the 
income-based pension 
Mandatory 
1 The Governments original proposal for income ceiling was 7 B.a. and unpaid care for children up to the age of 4 
(see also Annex 8 for original Pension Commission’s proposal and the other three alternative accrual models that 
have been considered).  
2 Updated 2008. Corresponding Parliament’s earlier (23 April 2007) accepted pension accrual rate 1.35% per 
year.
3 Updated 2008. Previous proposal: average of wage and price growth.
New model for pension accrual 
A new accrual model for the old age pension consists of the following qualities:
According to Government’s forthcoming bill sent for hearing in January 2008 an • 
income-based pension shall be based on NDC-model where 18.1 per cent of earnings 
are credited to the notional account. Pension entitlements shall be adjusted by wage 
growth and mortality credit. Basically, the new model is corresponding the earlier pro-
posals and Parliament’s framework where the accrual rate was set at 1.35 per cent of 
the income for a person that starts drawing the pension at the age of 67, given the life 
expectancy in 2010. 
All income between 0 B.a. and 7.1 B.a. (58 100 euros; NOK 465 000 in 2007) shall • 
result in a pension. 
A guaranteed pension at the level of the current minimum pension.  • 
The guaranteed pension to be reduced by 80 per cent of the earned earnings-related • 
pension.
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Even after the reform the National Pension Insurance Scheme continues to be financed on 
a pay-as-you-go basis. Likewise, the pension benefit continues to include two elements, a 
guaranteed residence based minimum benefit and an income based benefit. Contrary to the 
basic benefit in the present system, however, it is means-tested against the earnings-related 
pension benefit (see Figure 3.5). 
Reform will bring a stronger relationship between earnings and pension benefits as the 
earnings-related pension will be based on all-years-rule. Every year pension entitlements will 
be credited in a pension account in accordance with the person’s employment income and on 
the basis of unpaid care work. 
The reform ensures equal pension for equal lifetime income, irrespective of how this is 
divided over the working career, as long as the annual income is below the ceiling. In the new 
pension system there is a lower limit for pension earning thus providing a good ground for 
supplementary private pension scheme. The pension of the individual will in future consist 
of the pension from the statutory pension scheme combined with a pension from the supple-
mentary scheme. 
The clear correlation between work throughout life and the pension makes the model also 
easier to understand. 
Figure 3.5. The structure of new old age pension scheme in comparison to the current 
scheme. 
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A new model for drawing pensions
A new model for drawing the old-age pension consists of the following qualities:
It will be possible to draw a pension from the age of 62. • 
The flexible old age pension is designed in such a way that the annual pension reflects • 
the expected number of years as a pensioner. 
It will be possible to draw a full or partial old age pension as long as the pension from • 
age 67 exceeds the level of the minimum pension. 
It will be possible to combine the drawing of an old age pension with work, without • 
the pension being reduced.
The reform will establish a general, flexible retirement age under the National Insurance 
Scheme. Nevertheless, the AFP-scheme shall be maintained, however, with adjustments which 
are decided later on (2008) in negotiations with the social partners. According to the Gov-
ernment’s guidelines all employees subject to the AFP will receive a supplementary pension 
regardless of whether they decide to leave early before the age of 67 years. Currently, only 
those who choose to leave early benefit from this arrangement. 
After the reform the pension can be drawn fully or partially from the age of 62 and con-
trary to the current system it will become possible to combine pension and work without the 
pension being reduced. There will be no upper limit on retirement age. The aim is to ensure 
a good balance between incentives for work and freedom of choice. This will be reached by 
linking the benefits to life-expectancy for each cohort. The pension will be adjusted in accord-
ance with retirement age and remaining life expectancy, thus making the system also more 
actuarial. By remaining in the labour force for a longer period of time the individual’s pension 
will increase, and vice versa. 
Annual pension is increased by approximately 5 per cent for each year the retirement is 
deferred, because there will be one less year to divide the earned pension entitlement by. In 
addition, one additional year in the labour force will give extra pension accrual, which increases 
the annual pension by approximately 2.5 per cent. The proposed drawing model increases the 
total amount of the annual pension by approximately 7.5 per cent for each additional year in 
the labour force without drawing a pension.
It is estimated that the life expectancy based pension adjustment will mean that an indi-
vidual will have to work an additional 8 months in order to maintain the same replacement rate 
when the life expectancy of the population is increased by one year. This will result in a career 
2 ½ to 3 years longer in 2050, with the expected increase in the life expectancy. An example 
of the effect of the adjustment is presented in the following table, where reference is made to 
a person born in 1943 and retiring at the age of 67 in 2010. Those born in 1948 are the first 
who can choose to retire at the age of 62 in 2010. However, as it can be seen from the table, 
if they leave early their pension is going to be about 21 per cent smaller than those from the 
1943 cohort retiring at 67. Likewise, persons born in 1963 will get about 8 per cent and those 
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born in 1983 about 17 per cent lower pensions than reference level if they retire at the age of 
67. Thus, the younger cohorts should work until the age of 69 or 71, respectively, in order to 
compensate for the effect of the life expectancy adjustments.
Table 3.2. Old-age pension in relation to reference level1 classified by retirement age and 
cohort, %.
Age 1943-cohort 1948-cohort 1963-cohort 1983-cohort
 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75
 
80 
83 
87 
91 
95 
100 
105 
111 
118 
125 
133 
143 
153 
165
 
79 
82 
86 
90 
94 
99 
104 
109 
116 
123 
131 
140 
150 
161
 
74 
77 
80 
84 
88 
92 
96 
101 
106 
112 
119 
127 
135 
144
 
69 
71 
74 
77 
80 
83 
87 
91 
95 
100 
105 
111 
118 
125
1 Old age pension to a person born in 1943 and who takes retirement at the age of 67 in 2010 is equal to 100.
Source: Stensnes et al. 2007.
Thus, for a given retirement age, increasing life expectancy is reflected in an increasing divi-
sor. The divisors at different retirement ages for individuals belonging to the above mentioned 
cohorts are illustrated in Figure 3.6 
Figure 3.6. Divisor by retirement ages for selected cohorts.
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The Government’s proposal gives better incentives for work. At the same time, the overall 
effect on the pension level will also depend on e.g. life expectancy adjustment ratio and how 
the individuals adapt to it. The introduction of the life expectancy based pension adjustment 
ratio is also the most important measure in order to make the statutory pension scheme sus-
tainable in the long run. When the annual pension amounts are adjusted with this ratio the 
expenditure on old-age pension will remain more or less unaffected by the increased longevity. 
Individuals will be able to counteract the effect on their annual pension amount by deferring 
the reduction of their work effort and the drawing of their pensions. The ratio shall be the 
same for men and women.
In a flexible pension system, the differences in the annual pensions may increase, as a con-
sequence of the individuals’ own choice concerning time of retirement. In addition, everybody 
will not have the same opportunities to remain in work after having attained the age of 62.
Redefining and extending pension rights for non-working periods
The pension reform improves the minimum security of pension accruals for non-working 
periods. Today, pension accrual is granted in the case of unpaid care for children under the 
age of 7 and in the case of care for elderly, sick and disabled. After the reform everybody shall 
get a minimum pension accrual in case of unpaid care equal to an annual income of 4.5 B.a. 
(NOK 295 000; 36 850 euros), i.e. ½ B.a. higher than today. Otherwise pension entitlements 
from unpaid care work will be based on previous employment income, with an upper limit 
corresponding to the basis for calculating statutory maternity pay. Originally the Government 
proposed granting pension rights for care for children up to the age of 4. However, after the 
Parliamentary discussions this was changed up to the age of 6 years. 
In addition, conscripts are given pension earning. According to the Government’s proposal 
mandatory military service means that one has to refrain from an ordinary income from work, 
and thus from pension accrual. In the Government’s opinion, there are thus good reasons for 
the introduction of a pension crediting arrangement for persons serving as conscripts. 2.5 B.a. 
(NOK 163,760; 20,470 euros) is suggested as the basis for pension accrual for completed 
military service. It is suggested that such credit should be given in addition to any pension 
accrual based on income from work. The aim is to introduce this arrangement with effect for 
new conscripts from 2010.
The reform will also improve the provisions for pension accrual for unemployed persons, 
including persons who are involuntarily working part-time, while receiving unemployment 
benefits, so that unemployed will be credited with pension accrual based on previous income 
from work. In the current scheme, pension accrual is based on the unemployment benefits.
According to the pension settlement in the Storting, the Government was also asked to 
consider crediting students with pension earning. The Government reached the conclusion not 
to credit students with pension accrual. According to Government’s proposal persons with a 
higher education will often have a higher overall lifetime income than persons without higher 
education, something which will be reflected in higher pensions. 
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Changing indexation rules
The income dependent entitlements shall be adjusted by wage growth and mortality credit until 
retirement, while paid-out pensions shall be adjusted by an average of wages minus the 0.75 
percent (constant), that has already been imputed in the divisor when the balance in the notional 
account will be converted to an annuity (i.e. comparable to the Swedish pension scheme). This 
change will remove the indexing rule on wages passed in 2002. The guaranteed pension will 
be adjusted against wages, less the effect of the life-expectancy adjustment ratio.  
Transitional provisions
There is no final decision on the transitional provisions for the new accrual model for old-age 
pension in the National Insurance Scheme. According to the Government’s recent bulletin 
persons born in 1953 or earlier would have their pension entitlements determined on the basis 
of the present regulations.11 Persons born in 1963 or later will have their pensions determined 
solely on the basis of the new system. Persons born during the years 1954-1962 will have their 
pensions determined proportionally on the basis of the present and the new system.
The Government has also not made final decision on retroactive pension entitlements for 
unpaid care work under the present National Insurance Scheme.
However, the Government proposes that the life expectancy adjustment ratio is to be ap-
plied to new retirees from 2010 onwards, with flexible retirement being introduced at the same 
time. Likewise the new system for the indexing of pensions is to be applied to all retirees from 
2010 onwards.
The Government should present a proposal for legislation on a new pension scheme before 
the year end 2007.
Even after the reform, civil service pensions equivalent to two thirds of the wage at the time 
of retirement are continued. However, the civil service pension schemes are adjusted to the 
new National Insurance Scheme model, without decreasing the level of the civil service pen-
sions, but so that they are also covered by the provisions on the adjustment ratio based on life 
expectancy and the new indexation. The final adjustments will be made through negotiations 
between the social partners of the public sector. Also the AFP-scheme shall be maintained, 
however, with adjustments which are decided later on (2008) in negotiations with the social 
partners.
3.5.4  The main consequences of the reform
The Government’s proposal means that the expenditure on old age pensions as a per centage 
of mainland GDP is estimated to be reduced from 15 to 12 per cent in 2050 when compared 
to the present system. 
In a pay-as-you-go system where public pension expenditures are financed by current tax 
revenues, the ratio of workers to old-age pensioners has a significant impact on the fiscal bal-
ance sheet. One measure of the fiscal burden of the public pension scheme is the so-called 
contribution rate defined by Disney (2004) as “the average rate (on earnings) that would be 
11  see www.regjeringen.no news published 29.11.2007.
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required to finance current spending on public pensions without budgetary transfers or the 
accumulation or decumulation of public pension funds”. The contribution rate C may be 
formally defined as: 
C = P / (L + 0.5P)
Where P represents the yearly general pension expenditures in the National Insurance Scheme, 
and L represents aggregate yearly labour incomes, included compensation for the labour effort 
among the self-employed. It has also been taken into account that pension benefits are taxed 
at about half the tax rate on labour incomes (for further information see Stensnes et al. 2007; 
Fredriksen and Stølen 2005). 
The contribution rate is expected to double from about 11 per cent in 2006 to about 22 per 
cent in 2050. According to projections presented in the Government’s white paper the reform 
will reduce the contribution rate needed for financing the old age pension expenditure from 
21.8 per cent to 17.6 per cent in 2050 when compared to present system12. 
The tax burden of financing the sum of old age, disability and survival pension benefits 
has increased from a level of about 7 per cent in 1967 to about 15 per cent in the early years 
of 2000s. The contribution rate is estimated to increase to 25–30 per cent after 2040. This 
increase of about 10-15 per centage points is equivalent with the estimated increase in the 
expenditures in the Insurance Scheme from about 9 per cent of GDP in 2002 to almost 20 per 
cent in 2050 according to the report from The Pension Commission.  
The effects on the contribution rate (base line scenario) for financing old age pension 
expenditure are presented in Figure 3.7. A decomposition of the main elements of the reform 
reveals that the new earning model increases pension expenditures, when seen in isolation. 
This is caused especially by the increased connection between pension entitlements and former 
labour incomes, likewise the proposed accrual rate of 1.35% which is higher than at present. 
The effect of this element to is estimated to increase the contribution rate with 1.3 per centage 
point when compared to the present system. The old-age expenditure in 2050 is estimated to 
rise to NOK 238.4 billion in comparison to current system NOK 223.6 billion (as measured 
in 2006-values).
The introduction of the life expectancy based pension adjustment ratio is the main factor 
of the reform regarding reduction of the contribution rate. As life expectancy is assumed to 
increase during the entire period of projection, the effect of this element increases. This element 
also includes the effect of the flexible retirement permitting retirement from age 62. In total the 
contribution rate is reduced by 3.8 per centage points in 2050 (difference to upper curve). 
12 The future pension burden i.e. challenges of financing the increasing pension expenditures depend 
on the development in demographic characteristics like fertility, mortality and immigration, as well 
as characteristics affecting supply of labour, like education, disability, retirement age, participation 
rates and part time work (especially for women), and the design of the pension system. The effects 
on the contribution rate have been analyzed by use of Statistics Norway’s dynamic micro simula-
tion model, MOSART, documented in Fredriksen (1998). 
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Likewise the change in indexation rules is estimated to further reduce the rate by 1.2 per 
centage points in 2050. The difference between the two lowest curves represents the effect 
of increased supply of man-hours among persons of working age. Although labour supply is 
estimated to increase as much as 4 per cent as a result of closer connection between contribu-
tions to and benefits from the pension system, the partial effect on the contribution rate of this 
element is only about 0.5 per centage point in 2050. Thus, in total the Government’s proposal 
is estimated to reduce the contribution rate by 4.2 per centage point. 
Figure 3.7. Effects on the contribution rate caused by a shift to a new old age system, decom-
position in different elements. 
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Source: White paper. St.meld. nr. 5 (2006-2007).
According to the Government’s white paper the new system should give the average future 
pensioner, regardless of wage level, more money than existing pensions that take affect at age 
67. But there are two complicating factors that make a real comparison harder to measure, 
and they are both likely to work against future pension levels. One is an adjustment for life 
expectancy. All future pensioners will have their pensions reduced in step with increases in 
national life expectancy. The other is that pensions will not be increased completely in step 
with national wage increase rates, meaning pensioner purchasing power will be under that of 
the work force. Even so, pensions are increased more than the price growth. 
A changed indexation of paid-out pensions is, when seen in isolation, estimated to reduce the 
average replacement rate by 7–8 per cent after 10 years as a pensioner, compared to the situ-
ation if the pensions were indexed in line with the growth in wages.
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Moreover, the reform seeks to maintain the redistributive characteristics of the present sys-
tem. Stensnes and Stølen (2007) have analyzed the consequences of the reform by using the 
MOSART model and the first impressions of how different accrual schemes distribute income 
between individuals at system maturity in 2050 are shown in Figure 3.8. The horizontal axis 
measures the GINI coefficient of inequality and the vertical axis shows women’s pensions as 
a share of men’s, on average. Along the two dimensions, the reformed system would indicate 
growing inequality. 
However, it is worth noting that there is greater inequality in labor incomes than pension 
benefits. The public old age pension scheme is redistributive, due to components such as a 
minimum benefit and the annual income ceiling on accumulating pension entitlements. Income 
replacement ratios are therefore higher at the lower end of the income scale. A closer link be-
tween earnings and pensions in the accrual scheme will therefore tend to increase inequality 
in benefits, while this very link is also at the heart of improving work incentives by reducing 
the implicit tax rate on social security contributions. In deciding on a pension accrual scheme, 
government is faced with the classical trade-off between equality and efficiency. 
Figure 3.8. Distributional indicators for pension benefits in 2050.
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Stensnes and Stølen (2007) have also analyzed distributional consequences of the present and 
reformed old age pension systems in more detail breaking annual pension benefits in 2050 down 
by pension income per centile (see Annex 9). For the bottom four deciles, pension levels will 
remain largely unchanged with pension reform. This is mainly caused by a guarantee pension 
at the same level as the minimum pension in the present system before taking adjustments for 
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increasing life expectancy into account. The distributional impact of the other elements affect-
ing the lowest deciles is not large, and the different elements partly counteract each other. 
The top six pension income deciles will experience an increase in the pension level, reflecting 
both the increased accrual coefficient for pension entitlement and the sharpened actuarial prop-
erties of the system in general. The gains are largest for the highest income groups. For both 
schemes the curves are convex for the uppermost deciles, because they exhibit an increasing 
gap compared with the average incomes. 
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4 Pension schemes in Finland13
4.1 History of pension provision
4.1.1	 The	first	National	Pension	Act	and	Start	of	Earnings-Related	 
	 Pension	
The national pension scheme covering the whole population was established in 1937. The 
insurance based on personal pension saving accounts was mandatory for persons aged 18–65. 
An independent Social Insurance Institution, supervised by Parliament, was established to 
implement the act. This administrative model still applies to the national pension scheme. 
The National Pension Act of 1937 never achieved its aims. Due to the modest 2 per cent 
contributions, the level of the pensions could never have become very high. In addition high 
inflation during the war and reconstruction period gnawed the scheme. The low level of the 
national pension was the cause of dissatisfaction.
The employers and the employees had together established pension funds for the employ-
ees already prior to the National Pension Act. However, administration of these funds lacked 
actuarial know-how and their affairs were not supervised. At the end of the 1950s they covered 
about 220 000 people. The pension entitlements were usually lost when changing jobs. In ad-
dition pensions for 25 000 persons were arranged in private insurance companies. 
The State had its civil servants’ pensions, and many municipalities had their own pension 
regulations for their officials. According to the Public Welfare Act, the employer was liable to 
provide for his long-term employee in case of loss of work capacity due to old-age or illness. 
It was required that the employee did not get an income elsewhere. Until 1970 children had a 
legal obligation to provide for their ageing parents. 
4.1.2 “Civil servants’ pensions for all”
In the 1950s the structure of the labour force was changing with industrialization and the number 
of rural population started to decrease. Women continued to participate in the labour market 
after the war, so the social security in old-age based on home care diminished. Assistance pen-
sions for war widows, orphans and invalids provided a new model for pension provision.
13  Chapter 4.1 draws on Kontio (2007) and, chapter 4.3 on Börsch-Supan (2005). 
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There was a general agreement on the need to reform the National Pension Act, but all the more 
disputes about the direction of the change, even within parties. The flat-rate scheme financed 
by tax revenues came into force in 1956. This solution was supported by the representatives of 
the rural population. The level of the national pensions increased even 2.5 times. The abolish-
ment of the pension accounts was felt as an income transfer to farmers. This caused resentment 
especially in the employees’ organizations. 
The earnings-related pension committee was established at the end of 1956. When shap-
ing the earnings-related pension scheme the motto was “civil servant’s pensions for all”. The 
committee suggested creation of two pension acts, which would cover most of the private-
sector employees. The general private-sector pensions act Employees’ Pensions Act, (TEL) 
and the Temporary Employees Pensions Act (LEL) were enacted in 1961 and 1962. Financing 
of the pensions was and is still based partially on the pay-as-you-go principle and partially 
on pre-funding.
The employers got the right to borrow the accumulated pension funds through so-called 
premium loans. The employers’ support for the act was also sought through suggesting that 
earnings-related pensions be handled by private insurance providers. The committee saw a 
decentralised scheme also as cheaper than a centralised scheme.
The employees found the guarantee of receiving the accrued pensions from different 
employment contracts very important. Due to this vesting principle the competing pension 
providers needed a liaison body, maintaining a common register of the pension entitlements. 
The Finnish Centre for Pensions was founded. The Finnish Centre for Pensions was also to 
handle pension components financed jointly on the pay-as-you-go principle. 
4.1.3	 Period	of	broadening	pension	benefits
The 30-year period after the enactment of TEL in 1961 was a period of extension of the range 
and level of the pension benefits. As the number of pensioners was still low, the financing 
base was favourable for benefit enhancing reforms. The period was also dominated until the 
mid-1970s by the dispute over the direction in which to develop the pension system. Rivalry 
alternatives were the earnings-related pension scheme and the national pension scheme.
Originally the earnings-related pensions covered only old-age and disability. The TEL 
target level was 40 per cent of the final wage. An old-age pension accrued from employment 
contracts of at least six months from the age of 23, and a full old-age pension based on final 
wage accumulated in 40 years. The old-age pension could start at the age of 65. In contrast, in 
the LEL industries, where the work typically consisted of short-term employment contracts, 
average earnings were the basis of the pension. In the beginning earnings-related pensions 
were very small. They mainly supplemented the national pension.
In case of incapacity for work the person’s pension was calculated as if he or she had 
continued to working until the age of 65. The time from the beginning of the disability to the 
age of 65 is called the projected pensionable service. Survivors’ pensions extended the scope 
of the scheme in 1967.
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The Employees’ Pension Act affected the modernisation of the civil servants’ pensions. Local 
government pensions were harmonised through a separate act (Local Government Employees’ 
Pension Act KVTEL). The State Employees’ Pensions Act (VEL) was enacted in 1966.
In 1970 also entrepreneurs and farmers obtained statutory pension provision through the 
Self-Employed Persons’ Pensions Act (YEL) and the Farmers’ Pensions Act (MYEL). The 
following year the pension benefits were extended by the unemployment pension. 
Earnings-related pension provision was improved especially through an overall increase in 
1975, when the accrual rate was increased from 1 per cent to 1.5 per cent and the target level 
of the pension rose from 40 to 60 per cent. In this connection the roles of the national pension 
and the earnings-related pension were redefined. The primary role of the earnings-related 
pension was emphasised. Instead of the earlier full wage indexation a half-way index (50% 
weight on wages and 50% weight on consumer prices) was applied to pension calculation and 
revaluation of pensions from 1977. 
The individual early retirement pension was introduced in 1986. The individual retirement 
pension was a disability pension, with milder incapacity requirements than the normal disability 
pension. Also certain independent professionals and remaining non-covered temporary work-
ers obtained their own pensions act, Pensions Act for Performing Artists and Certain Groups 
of Employees (TaEL) in 1986.  The part time pension was introduced in 1987. It subsidises 
aged workers who want to shift to the part time work. The age limit has varied between 56 
and 58.
4.1.4	 Cost-cutting	reforms	in	the	1990s
The statutory pension scheme, as well as the whole society, faced a real challenge during the 
recession in the early 1990s. The unemployment rate reached almost 17 per cent in 1994 and 
GDP fell from 1990 to 1993 almost 11 per cent. 
In order to lessen the cost burden of the employers the employees were made directly 
responsible for part of the earnings-related pension costs from the beginning of 1993. The 
pension contribution was divided into the employers’ and the employees’ shares. Further 
changes of the contribution rate were equally divided by the employers and the employees. 
This principle still applies. The 66 per cent target level in the public sector pension replace-
ment rates was abandoned. Accrual rates were lowered and age limits were raised to match 
the private sector basis. 
In 1996 an extensive pension reform took effect. Previously the pensionable wage was 
calculated by taking into account the two middle-most years from the four last years in each 
employment contract. The calculation base gradually changed to the ten last years of each 
employment contract. Pensions paid to persons aged over 65 were revalued by a new index, 
in which consumer prices have a weighting of 80 per cent and wages a weighting of 20 per 
cent. The accrual rate for projected pensionable service was weakened from 1.5 after the age 
of 50 being 1.2 between 50 and 60 and 0.8 between the ages 60 and 65. The basic amount of 
the national pension, which was paid to all pensioners, was abolished.  
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4.2 The 2005 reform
4.2.1 The national pension scheme 
The 2005 reform kept the national pension scheme by and large untouched. It guarantees a 
minimum pension if the person’s earnings-related pension is small. The benefits include old-
age, disability and unemployment pensions as well as the survivors’ pension. The national 
pension scheme contains also special supplements including housing allowance for pension-
ers. Unemployment pensions will be abolished from the national pension scheme due to the 
2005 reform.
The national pension is usually awarded at the same time as the earnings-related pension. 
Each Euro paid by the earnings-related pension scheme reduces the national pension by 
50 cents until the national pension is zero (Figure 4.1). Approximately half of all retirees 
receive income from this scheme, but only 7 per cent have a national pension as their only 
pension income.
All benefits and earnings limits in the national pension scheme are linked to the consumer 
price index. From time to time an overall increase to the national pension is made by decision 
of the Parliament, so that the level of national pensions would not lag too much behind the 
general living standard. The latest overall increase was carried out in 2006 and the next will 
take effect at the beginning of 2008.
Figure 4.1. Total pension in 2007 according to earnings level, euros/month.
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4.2.2	 The	earnings-related	pension	scheme
Focus of the 2005 reform is the earnings-related pension scheme. It pursues three major 
aims:
(1) to make the earnings-related scheme more sustainable by
 (a) linking old-age and survivors’ benefits to life-expectancy
 (b) increasing the extent of prefunding
(2) to decrease labour market distortions by
 (a) restricting access to early retirement
 (b) introducing a window of flexible retirement age
 (c) sharply increasing the accrual rate within the window of retirement
 (d) abolishing the cap on the replacement rate
 (e) abolishing the link between benefit calculation and employment relationships
(3) to make the system more equitable by
 (a) basing benefits on life-time earnings and harmonizing benefit rules
 (b) equalizing the minimum age for benefit computation and contribution 
 requirement
 (c) changing indexation rules
 (d) redefining and extending accrual for non-working periods
 (e) redefining pensionable pay for the projected pensionable service
One principle of the reform was that each earned euro should contribute to the pension. Below 
each element of the reform will be discussed.
1 Increasing the sustainability of the earnings-related pension scheme
(a) Linking benefits to life-expectancy. From 2010 onwards old-age and survivors’ benefits 
will be indexed by life expectancy. The aim of the life-expectancy factor is to adjust benefit 
levels so that the present value of the benefits does not change when life expectancy changes. 
Beginning with the cohort of 1948, the starting level of the old-age pension of each cohort 
is multiplied by this factor. Each year the factor is the annuity value of the unit pension for 
a person aged 62 years relative to the annuity value of the unit pension for a person who is 
aged 62 in 2009.
Estimates of the life-expectancy factor based on two different population projections are 
presented in Figure 4.2. The effect of the factor has increased in between the population projec-
tions. For the younger cohorts the factor will create a substantial “pension gap”. Whether this 
gap will be filled by working longer, saving privately or a smaller pension is simply accepted 
is up to the individual.
(b) Increasing the extent of pre-funding. The Finnish earnings-related pension scheme is 
a partly pay-as-you-go and partly funded system which has about 120 billion euros worth of 
assets, invested both domestically and internationally (see Chapter 4.4).
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The funds are not individualized at the employee level, in the sense that an employee would 
be able to differentiate the funded part from the pay-as-you-go part nor to make an individual 
investment decision. The funded part affects the contribution rate, not benefits.
The 2005 reform included a decision to increase funding by 7.5 per cent of private sector 
wages during the next 8 years. This is additional funding on top of normal funding required 
by the scheme’s rules. The build-up of the 7.5 per cent fund is financed by an increase in the 
contribution rate of about 0.9 per centage points
Figure 4.2. The life-expectancy coefficient according to a pre-reform (Eurostat 2001) and 
the latest projection (Statistics Finland 2007). The coefficient is determined for each birth-
cohort. 
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2 Decreasing labour market distortions
The effective retirement age among Finnish workers is low compared with other OECD 
countries (Annex 5). The 2005 reform takes a number of measures to increase the labour force 
participation among elder workers. The aim is to increase the effective retirement age by three 
years until the year 2050.
(a) Restricting access to early retirement.  The pre-reform pension scheme had a 
multitude of pathways into retirement, including unemployment pension, variants of 
disability pensions and the part-time pension. 
The unemployment pension will be abolished for persons born 1950 or later. However, 
these individuals can still receive earnings-related unemployment benefits from the age of 
57 until they are eligible for old-age pension. This is two years later than the corresponding 
unemployment tunnel for older generations. 
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The individual early retirement pensions among the disability pensions will be abolished for 
individuals born after 1943. However, social factors in addition to medical factors will be taken 
in the account when granting disability pensions to individuals older than 60 years.
The part-time pension is made less attractive by reducing the accrual rate and increasing 
the eligibility age by two years. Workers can take up part-time pensions now two years later 
at age 58. Part-time earnings contribute to the old-age pension at the same rates as full-time 
earnings. In addition, the difference between full-time and part-time wage also enjoys pension 
accrual. The difference enjoyed an accrual rate of 1.5 per cent, in the reform this was reduced 
to 0.75 per cent. 
(b) Introducing a window of flexible retirement. The old system had an old-age retirement 
age of 65 and the possibility to retire earlier between ages 60 and 64 at the cost of actuarial 
adjustment to the pension. The adjustment was 0.4 per cent per month (4.8 per cent p.a.). The 
reform changes this to a window of retirement between ages 63 and 68 plus an early retirement 
option at age 62. The adjustment is 0.6 per cent per month (7.2 per cent p.a.). Retirement incen-
tives during the window period are mainly governed by a high accrual rate (see c below).
(c) Increasing accrual rates at older ages. Benefits are calculated by multiplying indexed 
pensionable earnings with the accrual rate. In the pre-reform system the accrual rate was 1.5 
per cent for earnings between ages 23 and 59 and 2.5 per cent for earnings between ages 60 and 
64. New accrual rates are 1.5 per cent between ages 18 and 52, 1.9 per cent between ages 53 
and 62 and 4.5 per cent between ages 63 and 67. Age-dependent accrual rates value earnings 
in later life more than earlier earnings. Therefore they create an incentive to work later.  
(d) Abolishing the cap on the replacement rate. The pre-reform scheme provided a cap on 
replacement rate through so-called pension integration. The private-sector earnings-related 
pension could not exceed 60 per cent of the highest pensionable wage during the career. In 
the public sector the limit was 66 per cent. This mechanism created a disincentive to work 
once the cap was reached. The new system abolishes the cap and there is no maximum on the 
replacement rate anymore.
(e) Abolishing the link between benefit calculation and employment contracts. In the 
pre-reform scheme the pensionable wage was calculated as an average from the ten last years 
of each employment contract. In practice this was a complicated rule with special clauses. 
However, if salaries increased with seniority, it created a disincentive to change job.  
3 Increasing equity
There are many elements in the 2005 reform designed to make the earnings-related pension 
scheme more equitable and more actuarial. In addition the reform added some “carrots” to 
reduce the impact of many “sticks”.
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(a) Basing benefits on life-time earnings and harmonizing benefit rules. As described above, 
the pre-reform scheme had elements of a final salary system. This procedure ignores earning 
differences among workers earlier in the career. It tends to benefit individuals with increasing 
salaries and stable employment contracts. However, in some sectors (self-employed, farmers 
and LEL workers) life-time average earnings have always been the basis of benefit calcula-
tion. One undesirable property of the old benefit rule was that even exactly identical earnings 
careers produced different pensions, if the number (or timing) of employment contracts varied 
between individuals. 
After the reform the scheme bases the pensionable wage on all earnings and does not 
distinguish among jobs in different sectors of the economy. The number or timing of the em-
ployment contracts does not affect the benefit level.
(b) Minimum age for benefit computation and contribution requirement. In the pre-reform 
system employers and employees had to pay contributions into the scheme from age 14 on. 
The benefit accrual, however, started at age 23. Individuals who started their careers early were 
penalized relative to individuals starting their career at age 23. In the reformed scheme contri-
butions are due for workers aged 18 and over and benefit accrual starts at the same age.
(c) Changing indexation rules. The reform introduced a subtle change in the indexation for-
mula applied to the pensions in payment. In the pre-reform scheme benefits of retirees aged 
less than 65 were indexed according to the half-way index (50% wages 50% prices). After age 
65 the index was changed to a 20–80 mixture. This created dissatisfaction among pensioners 
older than 65. The new scheme applies the 20–80 mix between wage and price increases to all 
retirees. However, in order to prevent large relative benefit decreases a lump-sum increase to 
young and middle aged pensioners was introduced. For individuals under 27 years of age the 
lump-sum increase is 21 per cent of their earnings-related (disability) pension. This increase 
is granted when the pension has been five years in payment. For persons older than 27 years 
the increase is reduced by 0.7 percentage points until it has disappeared. 
The working-age index (or wage coefficient) which is used to convert nominal money to 
real valued money to form the basis for the benefit calculation was also changed. Before the 
reform the 50-50 index was applied. In the new system this was changed to an index with 80 
per cent weight to wage changes and 20 per cent weight to price changes. It was estimated that 
this index together with basing benefits on life-time earnings would be cost neutral. 
(d) Redefining and extending accrual for non-working periods. The reform unifies and 
extends accrual calculation during non-working periods. Earnings-related unemployment 
periods had been covered also in the pre-reform scheme. Also non-working periods lasting 
less than one year, given that they were inside an ongoing employment relationship accrued 
a pension. Under the new system a pension accrues during earnings-related unemployment, 
parental leave, sickness leave and studies which terminate with qualification. There are also 
some less significant non-working periods accruing a pension.
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(e) Redefining pensionable pay for the projected pensionable service.  Before the reform 
an individual either had or had not a right to the projected pensionable service in the case of 
disability. Without the projected pensionable service the disability pension equals the accrued 
pension. The accrued pension is always low if the individual is young. The projected pension-
able service was granted if the end of the last employment relationship was not too distant 
from the occurrence of the disability. This meant that one single day could be decisive when 
calculating the amount of the pension.  In the reformed scheme the wage used for the projected 
pensionable service is the average wage from the five years preceding the disability. One day 
can not be decisive anymore when granting the disability pension.
The most important changes of the 2005 reform from the point of view of long-term expen-
ditures are collected in Table 4.1 sign (+ / -) shows a direction of the impact.
 Table 4.1. The most important changes affecting pension expenditures in the 2005 reform.
Before the reform After the reform Cost 
Pensionable earnings
The last 10 years 
from each emplo-
yment contract 
Life-time earnings -
Indexing entitlements Wage 50 / Price 50 Wage 80 / Price 20 +
Accrual rates
23-59 1.5% 18-52 1.5% +
60-64 2.5%
53-62 1.9%
63-67 4.5%
General retirement age 65 63-68 ?
Accrual for non-working 
periods
One year rule and 
earnings-related 
unemployment benefit
Almost all earnings-
related benefits +
Life expectancy coefficient No Yes -
Restricting  early retirement
Individual early reti-
rement and unemp-
loyment pension 
abolished. 
 
Start of  the part-time 
pension from 56 yea-
rs to 58 years
-
Transition rules 
The main rule is that the changes take effect from the beginning of the 2005. The pensions earned 
prior to 1.1.2005 are calculated as if the employment relationship ends 1.1.2005. This pension 
accrual is vested. After 1.1.2005 pensions accrue according to the reformed legislation. 
There are several qualifications to this general rule. Private sector employees who retire from 
the job they are holding on 1.1.2005 by 2012 are guaranteed a pension calculated according to 
the old legislation. However, if the new legislation results in a higher pension, it will be paid. 
Public sector employees must work until retirement in jobs they are holding 1.1.2005 if they 
want to enjoy special accruals based on old more generous benefit rules which were in force 
until early 1990s (see Chapter 1.3).  
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Restrictions of early retirement affect only younger cohorts. The right to the part-time pension 
at the age of 56 is kept for cohorts born in 1946 or earlier. Younger cohorts have the right to 
the part-time pension after the age of 58. The individual early retirement pension is abolished 
for cohorts born in 1944 or later. The removal of the unemployment pension will affect cohorts 
born after 1949. The life-expectancy coefficient affects cohorts born in 1948 or later.
Unification and renaming of pension acts 
As a consequence of the 2005 reform the private-sector employee pension acts TEL, LEL 
and TaEL were unified into the Employees Pension Act (TyEL). Also the local government 
and the state employees’ pension acts were rewritten and renamed (KVTEL -> KuEL, VEL 
-> VaEL).  
 4.3 effect of the 2005 reform on long-term prospects 
The Finnish Centre for Pensions calculated long-term contribution and expenditure effects of 
the 2005 reform in 2002. These projections are described below. The projections include only 
private sector employee schemes (TEL, LEL and TaEL), though the effects would be roughly 
similar if all the earnings-related pensions were included into the projection. Main assumptions 
of the projections are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Main assumptions of the long term projection 2002.
in 2002
in 2050
old legislation new legislation
Life expectancy, men 74.9 80 years
                           women 81.5 85 years
Old-age dependency ratio 22% 44%
Employment rate 67.7% 70.4% 72.0%
Effective retirement age 59 years 60.4 years 62.0 years
2005–2050
Growth in earnings level (p.a.) 1.75%
Investment yield (p.a.) 3.5%
It was estimated that the 2005 reform would postpone the effective retirement age by 1.6 years 
in the long run. Furthermore due to earlier reforms there was an assumption of an increase 
in the effective retirement age of 1.4 years. Therefore the total postponement would be three 
years. In 2002 it was anticipated that the effective retirement age would increase by 0.6 years 
by 2008. This change was in fact achieved by 2006. 
The old legislation implied ever increasing expenditure and contribution rates. These were 
consequences from ever increasing life expectancies. The reform stabilised the expenditure 
level after the 2030s to 31 per cent of the wage sum (Figure 4.3). As far as the long term ex-
penditures are considered, the most important reform element was the life-expectancy factor. 
In fact, according to the latest population forecast it is even more important than estimated 
before the reform (Figure 4.2). 
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The contribution effects of the reform follow mostly from the expenditure effects. However, 
the effect of the extra funding is also visible in Figure 4.4. Taken together, according to the 
long term projections the reform would cut expenditure and contribution rates approximately 
by 4 percentage points in the long run.
Figure 4.3. The projected expenditure rate for private-sector employees’ pension schemes 
(TEL, LEL, TaEL), 2002–2005.
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Figure 4.4. The projected contribution rate for private-sector employees’ pension schemes 
(TEL, LEL, TaEL), 2002–2005.
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4.4	 Pension	financing
After the 2005 reform benefit rules in the earnings-related pension scheme are mainly the 
same for all insured regardless of pension act. However, financing arrangement vary between 
the acts. 
The employers, the employees and the state contribute to the financing of the pensions. The 
role of these contributors varies between the schemes.  Pensions are mainly financed through 
the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) principle, but some schemes also include significant pre-funding 
(Table 4.3). The employees have paid part of the pension contribution since 1993 (Chapter 
1.4).
Table 4.3. Insured, contributors and assets in pension schemes.
Act insured Contributors Assets (31.12.06)
TyEL Private sector  
employees
Employers, employees 78.9 bn € 
MEL Seamen Employers, employees  
and the state
0.7 bn € 
YEL, MYEL Self-employed Self-employed and the state ≈ 0
VaEL, KuEL Sivil cervants Employers, employees and the 
state
34.8 bn € 
National  
Pension
Residents Employers and the state ≈ 0 
4.4.1	 Private	sector
Since their introduction private-sector employee pensions are being financed through partial 
funding. Part of the pensions is funded in advance and part is financed from current pension 
contributions. The implementation of private-sector employee pension provision has been 
decentralised to pension insurance companies (7 companies), company pension funds (30 
funds) and industry-wide pension funds (8 funds). 
The employer chooses the pension provider. However, the pension benefits do not depend 
on the pension provider. The pension providers may give bonuses or rebates on the pension 
contributions to the employers as permitted by its solvency. The level of the bonuses has va-
ried considerably both between pension providers and over time. Bonuses vary also between 
insurance contracts within the pension company. 
The pension insurance companies’ pension contribution includes pooled (or PAYG), old-age 
and disability components. The assets for future pensions are accumulated through the latter 
two components. Average contributions for the year 2007 are shown in Table 4.4. 
The pensions of self-employed persons are financed purely on the PAYG principle. The 
self-employed persons’ contributions are used to cover the pension expenditure for the year 
in the question and the state finances the remaining portion. 
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Table 4.4 Average components of the TyEL contribution in 2007.
Component Per centage
Pooled (PAYG) 16.1
Old-age 3
Disability 2
Other expenses 0.9
Bonuses -0.4
Temporary rebate -0.5
Total contribution 21.1
Asset allocation and realised returns      
Premium lending directed at the employers and investment loans were the most important in-
vestments up to the beginning of the 1990s. The deregulation of the financial market from the 
1980s and the recession in the 1990s significantly reduced the demand for premium lending. 
During the recession in the early 1990s the Finnish state rapidly acquired debts, and by 1997 
Finnish government bonds had become the most important asset class for the private-sector 
earnings-related pension scheme. Investment regulations were reformed in 1997. The aim 
was in general to diversify more investments and in particular direct more assets to stocks. 
The proportion of share investment grew between 1997 and 2006 from 11 to 40 per cent 
(Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5 Investment portfolio of  the private sector pension providers in 1997–2006.
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The market value of the invested capital has more than doubled between 1997 and 2006. The 
growth is due to the investment returns on and the fact that the funded contribution components 
have so far exceeded the funded components of pensions paid. At the end of 1997 the propor-
tion of investment in shares in the private sector was 11.0 per cent and at the end of 2006 as 
high as 39.3 per cent of all investments.
The period 1997–2006 is divided into three sub-periods according to the development in the 
stock market. The years of 1997–1999 and 2003–2006 were years of strong increase in share 
prices and the years 2000–2002 were years of strong decrease in share prices. The realised 
average return over the whole period was 7.3 per cent (money-weighted average, MWR). The 
average real rate of return was 5.8 per cent a year. Yearly returns are presented in Annex 7.
The realised real rate of return of almost 6 per cent clearly exceeds typical values used in 
the long term projections.  Even though the return has been achieved through fairly low-risk 
investments, there is reason to use a lower return assumption in the projections. The high 
realised returns are partly a consequence of the exceptionally good returns on Finnish shares 
during this particular period. Also decreasing interest rates have contributed to realised returns. 
The prevalence of either phenomenon cannot be relied on for the future.
Investment and financing reform in 2007
The investment operations and financing technique of the private-sector earnings-related pen-
sion scheme were reformed significantly through legislative changes at the beginning of 2007. 
The main aim of the reform is to increase the risk-bearing ability of the pension providers so 
that they can increase the proportion of investments in shares in their investment allocation. 
This raises the expected return and risk level of pension assets. When realised, the improved 
investment returns reduce the need to increase the pension contribution in coming decades. 
Financing rules in force prior to 2007 implied that the ratio of pension assets to wage sum 
would increase continuously. At the beginning of 2007 regulations were changed so that asset 
accumulation will slow down in the long term. As a consequence the contribution level will 
be more stable over time. 
4.4.2	 Public-sector	earnings-related	pension	financing
Public-sector pension financing was based on the PAYG principle until the late 1980s. At that 
time the Local Government Pension Institution started pre-funding aiming to prevent contri-
bution rates increasing to unsustainable levels. The target is to stabilise the contribution rate 
slightly under 30 per cent of wages. 
The premium income under the local governments’ pension scheme (KuEL) consists of 
the salary-based employer and employee contributions. In addition, there are pension con-
tributions based on pension expenditures and early retirement pensions. These contribution 
components help to maintain the salary-based contribution level close to the private sector 
level. Otherwise local governments would be biased to privatise their services production 
because of the pension contribution. 
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All the pension contributions from the state pension scheme (VaEL) are collected to the State 
Pension Fund. However, this fund does not pay the pensions. The state pensions are paid by 
the State Treasury from the state budget and the State Pension Fund may contribute and usu-
ally does contribute to the budget. The aim of the State Pension Fund is to accumulate funds 
until the assets correspond to one-quarter of the state pension liabilities. In 2007 almost half 
of the target was achieved. 
At the end of 2006 the Local Government Pensions Institution held 22.0 billion euros 
worth of assets and the State Pension Fund 10.3 billion. Figure 4.6 shows the development 
of earnings-related pension assets of the whole public sector from the end of 2000 to the end 
of 2006.
Figure 4.6 The investment portfolio of the public-sector pension providers, 2000–2006.
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Of the public-sector earnings-related pension assets approximately 52 per cent are invested in 
shares. The proportion of foreign investments in all investments was about 80 per cent. The 
proportions of investments in shares and foreign investments were clearly higher than in the 
private sector.
The higher proportion of investments in shares is explained by the difference in funding 
mode. In the public sector only the amount of the employee’s accrued pension rights has been 
determined, but not the share funded from it or thus the pension liability to be covered. The 
investment operations are based on the target allocation of investment objects as decided by the 
administrative bodies, from which deviations can be made within certain limits, for instance, 
on the basis of development in the view on interest rates or share prices.
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The Local Government Pensions Institution has also set a long-term target for the real rate of 
return, which is four per cent a year as of the start of funding. The average annual real rate 
of return of the investments of the Local Government Pensions Institution has been 4.9 per 
cent from the beginning of 1988 to the end of 2005. The State Pension Fund sets its targets 
annually.  
The public-sector investment returns have varied more than the private-sector returns (An-
nex 7). In years of falling share prices returns have been lower and in years of rising share 
prices higher than in the private sector. The larger variation is due to the larger proportion of 
investments in shares in the public-sector assets.
4.5 Future prospects 
The projections below have been prepared at the Finnish Centre for Pensions in autumn 2007 
(Biström et. al. 2007). The expenditure projections are based on the legislation which took 
effect in 2005. The calculations concerning the financing of private sector pensions follow the 
rules which take effect from the beginning of 2007. 
4.5.1	 Assumptions	
The most significant assumptions of the long-term calculations presented in the following 
are:
Population forecast by Statistics Finland 20071. 
The effective retirement age increases by 1.6 years by 2025 and by 2.4 years by 2050 2. 
(2006: 59.5 years)       
The employment rate increases to 71 per cent by 2025 and to 72 per cent by 2050 (2006: 3. 
69 per cent)                    
The real annual growth rate in earnings is 1.75% 4. 
The real return on pension assets is 4.0%.5. 
Figure 4.2 showed the development of the life expectancy coefficient. Other aspects of the 
Statistics Finland population forecast were presented above (Chapter 2.1). Rapid population 
ageing during the next 20 years is characteristic to Finland. In the longer run, however the 
pace of the population ageing is likely to slow down.
The long-term retirement age, employment rate assumptions are similar to those used in 
2002 projection. Furthermore the assumed growth rate of the earnings level is unaltered. The 
1.75 per cent growth rate is close to Finnish historical experience. Investment yields are as-
sumed to be 0.5 per cent higher in this latest projection compared to the earlier projections. 
Historical experience of close to six per cent yield as well as the financing reform of 2007 
motivated a higher rate. This last assumption is significant when evaluating the development 
of pension contributions and funds. 
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4.6 expenditures, contributions and assets 
The pension expenditure under the pension acts for private-sector employees (TEL, LEL and 
TaEL/TyEL) in proportion to the wage bill has been increasing since the acts entered into 
force in the early 1960s (Figure 4.7). The overall increase of 1975 can be seen in the figure 
(Chapter 1.3).  The recession in the 1990s and the recovery from this recession are the main 
deviations from the trend. In 2005 the expenditures amounted to 18.1 per cent of the wage 
bill. The growth in expenditure continues up to the 2030s, after which the expenditures settle 
at a good 30 per cent of the wage bill. 
The partial funding is visible in Figure 4.7. The contributions have exceeded the expen-
ditures, except for the worst years of the recession. The difference between contributions 
and expenditures as well as the asset yields has been used to accumulate pension assets. The 
expenditure level will exceed the contribution level permanently from the initial years of the 
2010s onwards. The difference between expenditures and contributions is financed through 
yields on the assets. 
Figure 4.7. Pension expenditure and contribution as per centages of the wage bill for TEL, 
LEL and TaEL/TyEL in 1963–2075. 
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The expenditure and contribution rates have been trending up because the scheme is maturing 
and the population is ageing. The pension acts are still in the maturation phase, since the oldest 
age groups have not had time to accrue an earnings-related pension during their whole work 
history. However, mostly the future increase in expenditures is a consequence of population 
ageing.
Although the expenditure level under TyEL will exceed the contribution level in the near 
future, the value of the assets of the pension providers handling TyEL insurance increases 
over the whole projection period. Even the ratio of TyEL assets to the wage bill increases till 
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the early 2030s. At the end of 2005 the TyEL assets amounted to approximately 1.8 times the 
corresponding wage bill. The pension assets will amount to almost 2.5 times the wage bill in 
2030 and roughly this level is maintained later on.
Public-sector pension expenditure in proportion to earned income has been about 10 per 
centage points higher than private-sector expenditure. This difference will continue to grow in 
the next few years, but in the longer term the differences in pension expenditure per centages 
between the sectors will narrow (Figure 4.8).     
The current difference in pension expenditure per centages is due to the historically more 
generous pension benefits of the public sector and privatisations. They have transferred jobs 
from the public to the private sector. On the other hand, there are no significant differences in 
current pension accruals between the sectors. In the projection the labour force shares of the 
different sectors are assumed to remain at their current levels. 
The total statutory pension expenditure can be divided into private-sector earnings-related 
pensions, public-sector earnings-related pensions and national pensions as well as the group 
other pensions, which includes pensions from workers’ compensation and motor liability insur-
ance, military accident compensations and pensions for front-veterans (Figure 4.9). 
Figure 4.8. Earnings-related pension expenditure, per centage of the wage bill by sector, 
1985–2075.
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Figure 4.9. Statutory pension expenditure in per cent of GDP in 1985–2050.
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The recession in the 1990s dominates the historical GDP share of pension expenditures. The 
GDP share of the statutory pension expenditures is currently not significantly higher than 20 
years ago. This is slightly surprising because the old-age dependency ratio of the population 
has increased continuously and the earnings-related pension scheme has been in its maturation 
phase. The significance of national pensions has declined. Also the GDP share of the labour 
income in general has declined after the recession. 
The projected growth in earnings-related pension expenditures is mainly a consequence of 
population ageing. Decreasing trend after 2030 comes from various sources. The life-expectancy 
coefficient limits expansion of earnings-related pension expenditures. Also public sector pen-
sion accruals are lower than they used to be. The decrease in national pension expenditures is 
mainly due to the fact that in the projection national pensions follow by 50/50 weight prices 
and wages. On the other hand the labour force does not shrink after 2030. 
4.7	 Benefit	level
Average benefit levels can be deduced from the expenditure projection. The ratio of the aver-
age pension to the average wage has been close to 50 per cent during the last 20 years. The 
earnings-related pension has grown faster than the wage level and the national pension has 
grown at slower pace. These trends will continue until the 2020s. At that time the earnings-
related pension scheme, which was established in 1962, will mature. From 2010 the life ex-
pectancy factor will cut the level of the earnings-related pensions, but it takes time to make a 
significant effect on the average benefit level.
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Figure 4.10. Statutory pensions in per cent of the average wage.14
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The ratio of average pension to average wage is of course an imperfect income measure. Cur-
rently close to one-third of the working age population are not employed or self-employed, that 
is they are not paid a wage. On the other hand, all pensioners by definition receive a pension. 
Different household sizes, paid and received income transfers as well as capital income also 
affect the purchasing power. All things considered, pensioner households’ disposable income 
was 80 per cent of the population average in 2004 (Rantala 2006) 
14 The beneficiaries include domestic residents receiving a pension in their own right. Persons receiv-
ing only survivors’ or part-time pensions are excluded. 
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5 Conclusions
Norway and Finland are expected to face relatively strong pressure in their public finances 
due to an ageing population and the resulting growing age-related public expenditure. The 
population of Finland is ageing faster during the next two decades than the rest of the EU 
member states. Although ageing in Norway is expected to be less pronounced than in Finland 
and most other OECD countries, Norway has been projected to experience one of the sharpest 
increases in public expenditures as a share of GDP. 
However, at the moment both countries are in a good financial position when compared 
to many other OECD countries. Growth in the economies has been strong in recent years 
and it is expected to continue. As a consequence employment has increased and unemploy-
ment decreased. Strong economic growth has affected positively to the general governments’ 
financial positions. Substantial pension funds place these two countries in a more favorable 
financial position than most other countries when it comes to dealing with the growth in 
pension expenditure. However, in Norway the pension funds are not earmarked for pension 
expenditures only. Revenues are partially used to cover overall budget deficits and the fund 
is fully integrated into the state budget. Another specific feature in the Norwegian pension 
fund is that it is mainly based on oil and gas-revenues. Despite large assets, the funds will 
only be able to absorb only a relatively small share of the rising expenditure. As was shown 
in this paper the pension fund in Norway has been projected to gradually decline after 2020. 
Naturally, as the petroleum wealth is limited this will bring fluctuation in the projections. 
Anyway, in both countries the increase in pension expenditures will have to be compensated 
for also by other means. 
The fiscal policy has been prudent in both countries and Governments are aiming to achieve 
stronger economic growth especially by boosting employment, among other things. This would 
strengthen the general governments’ financial position. This aim, strengthening the incentives 
for work has also been one of the main principles when countries have renewed their pension 
schemes. In both countries the average effective retirement age is clearly below the official 
retirement age. Low effective retirement age run contrary to the substantial projected increase 
in life expectancy. Besides expenditure pressure, the shrinking labor supply threatens to narrow 
down the tax base, which could jeopardize the sustainability of pension schemes. 
Norway and Finland have succeeded to prevent poverty among the elderly quite efficiently. 
This can largely be seen to be due a residence based national pension which aims to reduce 
poverty and comprehensive earnings-related pension schemes. The replacement levels in 
comparison to previous earnings are quite high among those with low or no earnings-related 
pension. However, as the national pensions in Finland are mainly adjusted in line with the 
increase in prices the relative benefit level among low earners is likely to reduce over time. 
In Norway national pensions are better guaranteed as benefits are adjusted in line with the 
increase in wages.
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In both countries the pension reforms are intended to improve long term fiscal sustainability, 
basically by stimulating employment. Earnings-related pensions are modified so that benefits 
are calculated on the basis of incomes received during the whole professional career. This 
also brought reforms for pension accrual for non-working periods. Pension accrual for non-
working periods became more transparent and comprehensive. In total the reforms will bring 
a closer correlation between work throughout life and the pension. Likewise in comparison 
to previous system the new pension system ensures equal pension for equal lifetime income. 
Previously, in practice both countries had elements of final or last years salary system. This 
was visible especially in Finland, as pensionable wage was calculated as average from ten last 
years of each employment contract. All-years-rule is thus an important step towards making 
the pension system more sustainable and fair. Reforms will make the pension scheme easier 
to understand and more robust over time. 
Norway is also establishing a similar guarantee pension as in Finland. Thus, incentives for 
work are added also for people with low incomes compared to current system when insured 
may not receive any pension in excess of the national pension. 
At the same time, the overall effect on the pension level will depend on e.g. the life-expect-
ancy based pension adjustment and how the individuals adapt to it. Together with the flexible 
retirement age individuals have a possibility to choose whether they want to compensate the 
effect of the life expectancy adjustment and remain in the work force for a longer period of 
time or retire with a lower pension. In both countries life-expectancy adjustment will begin to 
affect the level of new pensions from 2010 onwards. In Norway flexible retirement age and the 
effect of life-expectancy adjustment affect also the guarantee pension, contrary to Finland.
As a result of the reforms adopted, the replacement rate is over time projected to decline 
due to the life expectancy adjustment and the extension of the calculation of pensions on whole 
career earnings, unless retirement is postponed. Also indexation rules were changed. Norway 
is to change the indexation of paid-out earnings-related benefits which shall be adjusted in 
line with the average of the growth in prices and wages. Otherwise earnings-related pension 
entitlements and guarantee pensions shall continue to be adjusted in line with changes in wages. 
In Finland the 2005 reform brought only minor changes to indexation of pensions in payment. 
The pension entitlements are adjusted with a mixture of wages at 80% and of prices at 20% 
after the reform instead of 50 – 50 weights before the reform. This index change together with 
the extension of the calculation of pensions on whole career earnings was estimated to be cost 
neutral. Guarantee pensions in Finland continue to be indexed with the consumer price index 
increased with discretionary overall adjustments by the Parliament. 
Norway established mandatory occupational pensions which is partially planned to compen-
sate the reductions in future benefit levels. In Finland the strategy is different, concentrating to 
the development of statutory pension scheme and there has been no active policy for develop-
ment of private pension provision or a “multipillar” pension system. As a major difference to 
Norway and a specific feature of the Finnish earnings-related pension scheme is that there is 
no income or pension ceiling.  
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The reformed pension scheme in Finland and the forthcoming pension reform in Norway 
make pension schemes far more sustainable. The recent reforms of the pension system should 
significantly reduce the pressures to increase pension contributions. Due to life expectancy 
adjustment pension schemes expenditure will in practice remain unaffected by the increased 
longevity. In both countries the last reforms imply a rise in the effective retirement age. In 
Finland the latest results indicate that the older employees are remaining in the labor market 
longer than they did before the reform of 2005.
Finnish and Norwegian Pension Reform – Implications for Preparing Aged Society 
FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, WORKING PAPERS          59
Sources
Bellone, Benoît and Bibbee, Alexandra. 2006. The ageing challenge in Norway: ensuring a 
sustainable pension and welfare system. Economics department working papers No. 480. 
OECD, Paris. Also available: http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2006doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86
e5fc12569fa005d004c/bd5d569a43e9b96cc125711d0031b46e/$FILE/JT00201167.PDF
Biström P., Klaavo T., Risku I. and H. Sihvonen. Pension expenditure, contributions and funds 
until the year 2075, Finnish Centre for Pensions, Reports 2005:3
Biström P., Klaavo T., Risku I. and H. Sihvonen. Lakisääteiset eläkkeet – pitkän aikavälin 
laskelmat 2007, Eläketurvakeskus, Raportteja 2007:2.
Biström P. and K. Elo. Väestöennustekatsaus, Eläketurvakeskus, Katsauksia 2007:5.
Disney, R. (2004): Are contributions to public pension programmes a tax on employment? 
Economic Policy, July 2004, 267–311.
Börsch-Supan A. (2005). The 2005 Pension Reform in Finland, Finnish Centre for Pensions, 
Working Papers 2005:1. 
Folketrygdfondet. www.ftf.no
Fredriksen, D. (1998): Projections of Population, Education, Labour Supply and Public Pen-
sion Benefits – Analyses with the Dynamic Microsimulation Model MOSART. Social and 
Economic Studies 101, Statistics Norway.
Fredriksen, Dennis and Stølen, Nils Martin. 2005. Effects of demographic development, labour 
supply and pension reforms on the future pension burden. Discussion Papers No. 418. 
Statistics Norway, Research Department. Also available: http://www.ssb.no/publikasjoner/
DP/pdf/dp418.pdf
Förster, Michael and M.Mira d’Ercole. 2005. Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD 
Countries in the Second Half of the 1990s. OECD Social Employment and Migration 
Working Papers. No. 22, OECD, Paris.   
IMF, International Monetary Fund. 2007. IMF Country Report No. 07/197. Norway. 
Kontio K. (2007) History of Pension Provision  (in “The Finnish Pension system” ed. Hiet-
aniemi M. and S. Ritola). Finnish Centre for Pensions Handbooks 2007:6.
Ministry of Finance. 2007. On the management of the Government Pension Fund in 2006. 
Report No.24 (2006–2007) to the Storting. Also available at:  http://www.regjeringen.no/
pages/1966215/PDFS/STM200620070024000EN_PDFS.pdf
Ministry of Finance. 2006. Country fiche on pensions: Finland. www.vm.fi/vm/en/04_publica-
tions_and_documents.
NAV, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Organisation. www.nav.no.
Norges Bank (The Central Bank). www.norges-bank.no
NOU 2004:1(Norges offentlige utredninger, in English: Norwegian Public Reviews). Mod-
ernising the National Insurance Scheme – Sustainable Pensions for the Future.
Pdf: http://www.pensjonsreform.no/dokumenter/pdf/pensjon_med%20bokmerker.pdf
Finnish and Norwegian Pension Reform – Implications for Preparing Aged Society
60 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, WORKING PAPERS
NOSOSCO 2007. Social Protection in the Nordic Countries 2005. Scope, Expenditure and 
Financing http://www.nom-nos.dk/nososco.htm
NOU 2007:4 (Norges offentlige utredninger, in English: Norwegian Public Reviews). Ny 
uførestønad og ny alderspensjon til uføre
Pdf: http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1976657/PDFS/NOU200720070004000DDDPDFS.
pdf
Pension Commission’s Preliminary Report. 2002. Mål, prinsipper og veivalg for pensjons-
systemet. Foreløpig rapport fra Pensjonskommisjonen 4. september 2002. http://www.
regjeringen.no/Upload/AID/kampanjer/pensjonsreformen/dokumenter/Rapport_pensjon-
skommisjonen_forelopig2002.pdf
Rantala J. Tulojen muuttuminen siirryttäessä eläkkeelle, In ”Eläkeläisten toimeentulo 1990-
luvulla” (eds. Hagfors, R., Hellsten, K., Ilmakunnas, S. and H. Uusitalo). Finnish Centre 
for Pensions, Studies 2003:1.
Social Insurance Institution. Kelan hoitama sosiaaliturva 2005–2050, Kansaneläkelaitoksen 
aktuuarijulkaisuja 7 (actuarial publications of the Social Insurance Institution), 2006.
SSB, Statistics Norway, Statistisk sentralbyrå. www.ssb.no
Stensnes, Kyrre and Stølen, Nils Martin. 2007. Pension Reform in Norway: Microsimulating 
effects on government expenditures, labour supply incentives and benefit distribution. 
Statistics Norway. Discussion paper to be published.
Stensnes, Kyrre; Stølen, Nils Martin and Texmon, Inger. 2007. Pensjonsreformen: Virkninger 
på statsfinanser, effektivitet og fordeling. Statistisk sentralbyrå (Statistics Norway). Re-
ports. 2007/11. Also available: http://www.ssb.no/emner/12/01/rapp_200711/rapp_200711.
pdf
The Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund. (Statens Pensjonskasse, SPK). www.spk.no
The Municipal Insurance Company (Kommunal Landspensjonskasse, KLP) www.klp.no
Työeläkelaitosten sijoitustoimintaa koskeva selvitys (survey of the investment activities of the 
authorised pension providers), Helsinki 2006.
White Paper.  St.meld. nr. 12 (2004-2005). Pensjonsreform – trygghet for pensjonene. http://
www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/STM/20042005/012/PDFS/STM200420050012000DDDP-
DFS.pdf
White Paper. St.meld. nr. 5 (2006-2007). Opptjening og uttak av alderspensjon i folketry-
gden.
http://www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/STM/20062007/005/PDFS/STM200620070005000DDDP-
DFS.pdf
Finnish and Norwegian Pension Reform – Implications for Preparing Aged Society 
FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, WORKING PAPERS          61
AnneX 1 
The social expenditure in Norway and Finland as per centage of GDP by main group and type 
(cash vs. services) 2005.
norway  Finland  
As % of GDP Of which in cash 
(%)
The social  
expenditure in 
per cent
Of which in cash 
(%)
Families and 
children
2,9 56 3,1 55 
Unemployment 0,6 85 2,5 90
Illnes 7,7 32 6,9 18
Old-age 7,1 74 9,0 89
Disability 4,6 82 3,4 73
Survivors 0,3 98 1,0 100
Housing 0,1 0 0,3 0
Other 0,6 49 0,5 54
Total 23,9 59 26,7 63
GDP million NOK/
EUR  1 942 887     157 162  
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AnneX 2
Distribution of household disposable income among individuals, Gini coefficients, mid-
1980s to years around 2000.
 Mid-1980s Mid-1990s 2000
Australia 31,2 30,5 30,5
Austria 23,6 23,8 25,2
Canada 28,7 28,3 30,1
Czech Republic .. 25,7 26
Denmark 22,8 21,3 22,5
Finland 20,7 22,8 26,1
France 27,6 27,8 27,3
Germany .. 28,3 27,7
Greece 33,6 33,6 34,5
Hungary .. 29,4 29,3
Ireland 33,1 32,4 30,4
Italy 30,6 34,8 34,7
Japan 27,8 29,5 31,4
Luxembourg 24,7 25,9 26,1
Mexico 45,1 52 48
Netherlands 23,4 25,5 25,1
New Zealand 27 33,1 33,7
Norway 23,4 25,6 26,1
Poland .. 38,9 36,7
Portugal .. 35,9 35,6
Spain 36,7 33,9 32,9
Sweden 19,9 21,1 24,3
Switzerland .. .. 26,7
Turkey 43,5 49,1 43,9
United Kingdom 28,6 31,2 32,6
United States 33,8 36,1 35,7
OECD average 1 29,3 30,9 31
Slovenia .. .. 22,3
notes Mid-1980s rather than 1985
 Mid-1990s rather than 1995
1 OECD average includes listed countries for which data are available for 
mid-1980s
 
Source: OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics - 
For further information: Förster, Michael and M.Mira d’Ercole 2005.
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AnneX 3  
The distribution of the disposable household income for Finland and Norway in 2004, broken 
down by quartiles. The quartiles have been calculated on the basis of the equivalent disposable 
income. The first quartile is made up of the households with the lowest incomes, whereas the 
households with the highest incomes are found in the fourth quartile. 
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AnneX 4 
Example of old-age pension calculation in Norway.
Example 1. Calculation of pension points, if pensionable income at the bending point i.e. 
6 x average B.a. in 2007:
Insured’s annual income = 6 x average B.a., year 2007:
                      6 x 65 505 NOK – 65 505 NOK    
                                                                             = 5 pension points
                  65 505 NOK
 
Example 2. Calculation of pension points, income exceeding 6 x average B.a:
Insured’s annual income: 423 900 NOK 
6 x average B.a. : 393 030 NOK
Exceeding income: 30 870 NOK, where 1/3 is taken into account = 10 290 NOK
Income from which the pension points are calculated: 393 030 + 10 290 = 403 320 NOK
                      403 320 NOK – 65 505 NOK    
                                                                            = 5.16 pension points
                  65 505 NOK
 
Example 3. Pension amount. 
Insured’s average pension point figure (20 best years) = 5.16 (final pension point)
     
40 pension earning years, with 15 pension earning years prior to 1992:
           
 1)                      66 812 NOK x 5.16 x 25 x 45
                                                                            =  96 960,91 NOK
                 40 x 100
2)                        66 812 NOK x 5.16 x 15 x 42
                                                                            = 54 298,11 NOK
                 40 x 100
3) Supplementary pension (in total)                    = 151 259,02 NOK
4) A full basic pension                                         = 66 812 NOK
5) Old-age pension, total                                  = 218 071 NOK
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AnneX 5
Average effective age of retirement versus the official age, 2005. Source, www.oecd.org.
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AnneX 6
Number of pensioners in Norway and Finland at year end 2006.
31.12.2006 norway Finland1
 
Old-age pensioners 
 
Disability pensioners  
 
Part-time pensioners 
 
Unemployment pensioners 
 
Special pension for farmers 
 
Surviving spouse 
 
Surviving children 
634 216 
 
327 818 
 
  - 
 
  - 
 
 - 
 
 24 009 
 
 14 043
918 930 
 
256 276 
 
30 628 
 
47 621 
 
30 545 
 
259 162 
 
24 625
Total 1 000 086 1 313 566
 
Source: NAV, Finnish Centre for Pensions.
1 One person may simultaneously receive several different pension benefits. For line Total, each person  
has been counted only once.   
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AnneX 7
Annual real returns on the Pension Funds in Norway and Finland, 1997–2006, %.
Net real return 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Aver-age
FIN1 Private-sector Public-sector
6.3 
-
10.5 
-
10.9 
-
1.5 
-0.1
-1.3 
-3.4
-0.7 
-9.2
7.3 
8.5
7.4 
8.2
10.4 
13.8
6.4 
8.4
5.8 
4.9
NOR
Pension Fund- 
Global2 
Pension Fund- 
Norway3
7.2 
 
5.6
8.2 
 
-2.3
10,9 
 
6,2
0.4 
 
3.1
-3.7 
 
1.0
-6.6 
 
0.5
10.8 
 
13.3
6.3 
 
10.1
8.5 
 
7.3
5.6 
 
8.6
4.6 
 
5.2
 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2007; The Finnish Pension Alliance (TELA). 
1 The real return is calculated by deflating the nominal return by the change in consumer prices for the 
relevant year. The average return has been calculated by weighting the observed return for each year 
with the average bound capital during the year (money-weighted average, MWR).
2  Geometric real return in international currency calculated on the basis of a weighted average of retail 
price growth in the countries included in the Fund’s benchmark portfolio. Average management costs 
were 0.09 pct. of the assets under management over this period.
3 Geometric real return in Norwegian kroner. Management costs are assumed, for technical calculation 
purposes, to have been 0.05 pct. of assets under management.  
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AnneX 8 
Main differences between the proposed pension accrual models in the Norwegian pen-
sion scheme.
Government’s 
proposal
Pension 
Committee’s  
proposal 
Model with   
basic pension  
(Model D)
“Bending point” 
model  
(Model A)1
Accrual rate 
 
 
Lower limit for pension 
earning 
Ceiling 
Basic pension 
Guarantee pension 
Minimum pension 
Reduction of guarantee 
pension 
 
Unpaid care
1.35% 
 
 
0 B.a.7 B.a. 
 
0 B.a. 
1.79 B.a. 
1.79 B.a. 
80% of the  
earned income-
pension 
 
4.5 B.a. for child 
under 4 years
1.25% 
 
 
0 B.a.8 B.a. 
 
0 B.a. 
1.79 B.a. 
1.79 B.a. 
100% up till 1 B.a. 
and 60% over 1 G 
 
5 B.a. for child 
under 6 years
0.85% 
 
 
1.79 B.a.8 B.a 
 
1.79 B.a. 
– 
1.79 B.a. 
– 
 
 
 
5 B.a. for child 
under 6 years
1.7% for 0–3 B.a. 
0.8% for 3–8 B.a. 
 
0 B.a. 
 
8 B.a. 
0 B.a. 
1.79 B.a. 
1.79 B.a. 
100% up till 1 B.a. 
and 60% over 1 G 
 
5 B.a. for child under 
6 years
 
1Another variation of this type of model is model B. Model B gives an income-based pension equal to 2.3% of the 
income up to 2 B.a., and 0.7% of the income between 2 and 8 B.a.. The guaranteed pension will be reduced with 
100% of the income-based pension.
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AnneX 9
Pension benefits*(NOK) in 2050 by per centile. 
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* Benefits are shown before indexation and exposure to the life expectancy adjustment divisor for a constant level 
of the B.a., which is given a nominal anchor equal to its 2006 mean value (NOK 62 161). 
As corrections for life expectancy and indexation are excluded from the distributional analysis, 
this is the main reason why a majority of income groups seem to gain from the reform. The 
figure is therefore a good indication of distributional consequences, but misleading seen from 
a fiscal perspective.  
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